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RETHINKING  ANTI-AGGREGATION  DOCTRINE
David L. Noll*
This Article proposes a new approach to “anti-aggregation agree-
ments”—contractual provisions that purport to prohibit parties from partici-
pating in class actions and other aggregate proceedings.  Anti-aggregation
agreements are permitted by Supreme Court doctrine under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act but eliminate financial incentives for attorneys to seek out and
prosecute wrongdoing.  Where private litigation performs an important deter-
rent function, anti-aggregation agreements raise the prospect that protected
companies will be permitted to violate the law with impunity.
Taking the Supreme Court’s arbitration doctrine as a given, the Article
argues that an anti-aggregation agreement’s enforceability should be tied to
its effect on actual regulatory compliance.  Consistent with the Court’s prefer-
ence for privately-designed dispute-resolution procedure, this test allows an
anti-aggregation agreement to be enforced by default.  But if a party shows
that the agreement permits significant, unremedied wrongdoing, the agree-
ment is not enforced.
In contrast to the leading approach in the doctrine and scholarship,
this test allows enforcement of anti-aggregation agreements that eliminate
claiming against a protected company.  At the same time, the test invalidates
agreements that result in substantial wrongdoing, regardless of their effect on
claiming.  In doing so, the test ties the decision not to enforce an anti-aggre-
gation agreement to a fact of normative and legal significance.  Where it is
shown that enforcement of an agreement permits significant unremedied
wrongdoing, there can be little doubt that eliminating incentives for private
attorneys to enforce the law creates an impermissible gap in the regulatory
enforcement framework.
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The disagreements and circuit splits that have followed the
Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T v. Concepcion1 provide a much-
needed opportunity to reconsider doctrine governing the enforceabil-
ity of anti-aggregation agreements—contractual provisions that pur-
port to prohibit either side to a contract from asserting claims in
connection with others.2  A basic justification for rules that authorize
aggregate claiming is to overcome the problem of process costs over-
whelming the stakes in individual proceedings.  By permitting simi-
larly-situated claimants to share the costs of claiming, aggregation
enables claiming that otherwise would be a money-losing proposi-
tion.3  Together with rules that permit an attorney to recover reasona-
1 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Compare In re Am.
Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. granted sub
nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (invalidating anti-aggrega-
tion agreement that made it prohibitively costly to assert antitrust claim), and Reyes v.
Macy’s, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 836 (Ct. App. 2011) (denying a motion to arbitrate
claim under California Private Attorney General Act, because Act creates a group, not
individual, claim), with In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex IV), 681 F.3d 139, 145
(2d Cir. 2012) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing
that “Amex III is incompatible with the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act]”), and Litman v.
Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2011) (reading Concepcion to establish that
any “state law that seeks to impose class arbitration despite a contractual agreement
for individualized arbitration is inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, the
FAA”), and Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372, 385 (Ct. App.
2012) (enforcing a motion to arbitrate claim under California Private Attorney Gen-
eral Act, on the ground that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts  state non-waiver
rule).
2 See, e.g., Citibank, Checking Plus (Variable Rate) Account Agreement 5 (Sept.
13, 2011) (on file with Notre Dame Law Review) (“Unless mutually agreed to by you and
us, claims of two or more persons may not be joined, consolidated, or otherwise
brought together in the same arbitration (unless those persons are joint account
holders or beneficiaries on your account and/or related accounts, or parties to a sin-
gle transaction or related transaction).”).  A note on terminology:  because they most
obviously affect class action litigation, pre-dispute agreements to forgo litigating or
arbitrating disputes on an aggregate basis are commonly referred to as “class action”
or “class arbitration” waivers. See, e.g., Hans Smit, Class Actions and Their Waiver in
Arbitration, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 199, 201 (2004) (discussing waivers).  However,
such agreements typically proscribe all proceedings that do not take place on a one-
on-one basis, including not only class actions, but consolidated individual proceed-
ings and suits brought by a private party in a private attorney general capacity.  I thus
use the more general “anti-aggregation” label.
3 See, e.g., ROBERT G. BONE, THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 266–67 (2003)
(“The class action collects all the same claims together in a single lawsuit with a large
aggregate recovery.  This gives an attorney a strong incentive to take the case and earn
a fee based on the results he achieves for the class as a whole. . . . From an economic
point of view, the main benefit of the small claim class action is deterrence.”);
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
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ble fees from the “common fund” created by a successful lawsuit,4 this
creates a powerful incentive for private attorneys to seek out and pros-
ecute violations of the law.5
Anti-aggregation agreements pose a direct challenge to this
mechanism of law enforcement.  Formally justified as an effort to sim-
plify and streamline dispute resolution, their most important practical
effect is to eliminate the cost-spreading made possible by aggregation.
In doing that, anti-aggregation agreements eliminate incentives for
attorneys to seek out and prosecute violations of the law.
The challenge for courts, underscored by Concepcion, is that pri-
vate agreements governing dispute resolution procedure are sheltered
by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).6  Although the FAA allows an
anti-aggregation agreement to be invalidated “upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,”7 the
Supreme Court has read the Act to express a “liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration,”8 which ordinarily demands enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements “according to their terms.”9  In the absence of
wholesale revision of the Court’s FAA jurisprudence, the question is
what, if anything, overrides the FAA’s default policy of enforcing pri-
vate dispute resolution contracts according to their terms.
PRIVATE GAIN 6–7 (2000) (“Damage class actions have significant capacity to achieve
public goals: to compensate those who have been wrongfully injured, to deter wrong-
ful behavior, and to provide individuals with a sense that justice has prevailed.  But
what drives damage class actions is private gain: the opportunity they offer lawyers to
secure large fees by identifying, litigating, and resolving claims on behalf of large
numbers of individuals, many of whom were not previously aware that they might
have a legal claim and most of whom play little or no role in the litigation process.”);
1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:8 (5th ed. 2011)
(“[C]lass actions deter misconduct by harnessing private attorneys general to assist in
the enforcement of important public policies.”).
4 See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980).
5 In the words of the article that first recognized the point, “the class suit is a
vehicle for paying lawyers handsomely to be champions of semi-public rights. . . .
[T]he suit which might not be brought at all because the demands on legal skill and
time would be disproportionate to the original client’s stake can, when turned into a
class suit, be brought and handled in a manner commensurate with its magnitude.”
Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U.
CHI. L. REV. 684, 717 (1941).
6 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
7 Id. § 2.
8 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (quoting
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
9 Id. at 1745–46 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
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This Article proposes that the enforceability of an anti-aggrega-
tion agreement should turn on its effect on actual regulatory compli-
ance.  Consistent with the Supreme Court’s preference for privately-
designed dispute-resolution procedure, this approach allows an anti-
aggregation agreement to be enforced by default.  But if a party shows
that an agreement permits significant unremedied wrongdoing, it is
not enforced.  I refer to this as the “outcomes approach.”
The outcomes approach differs substantially from the leading
approach in the doctrine and scholarship—here termed the “claiming
approach.”10  Under the claiming approach, the enforceability of an
anti-aggregation agreement depends entirely on its effect on claiming:
if an anti-aggregation agreement has too great an effect on the inci-
dence or availability of claiming against a protected company, it is not
given effect.  The outcomes approach, by contrast, enforces agree-
ments that eliminate claiming, but only if they do not permit signifi-
cant, unremedied wrongdoing.
The benefits of this change in focus are twofold.  First, the deci-
sion not to enforce an agreement is linked to a fact of normative and
legal significance.  Where it is shown that enforcement of an anti-
aggregation agreement permits significant unremedied wrongdoing,
there can be little doubt that eliminating incentives for private attor-
neys to enforce the law creates an impermissible gap in the regulatory
enforcement framework.  Second, the outcomes approach avoids
problems of tailoring endemic to the claiming approach; because of
its focus on claiming, the claiming approach fails to account for the
possibility that mechanisms other than private litigation will provide
adequate enforcement of the law, as well as the possibility that wrong-
doing will persist despite de minimus claiming (a phenomenon made
10 See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir.
2012) (invalidating anti-aggregation agreement that made assertion of antitrust claim
prohibitively costly and largely following, although not citing, J. Maria Glover, Note,
Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59
VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1760–69 (2006)); Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1222–24
(11th Cir. 2007) (invalidating anti-aggregation agreement under Georgia law because
it made claiming cost-prohibitive and adversely affected the market for representation
of legal claims); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 56–59 (1st Cir. 2006) (invali-
dating contractual restrictions on attorney’s fees and costs and availability of class
arbitration, because they prevented effective vindication of federal antitrust rights);
Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide
Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1905 (2006) [hereinafter Nagareda,
Aggregation] (proposing that in determining the enforceability of a class-action waiver,
courts examine “whether the unavailability of aggregation would reduce the potential
upside [to plaintiffs’ counsel] to such a degree as to demonstrate a ‘likelihood’ that
lawyers will not represent claimants”).
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possible by anti-aggregation agreements that cover the costs of claim-
ing on an individual basis).  As a result of these benefits, the outcomes
approach is far less susceptible to claims that it is inconsistent with the
FAA.
Admittedly, the shift to fact-intensive analysis focused on regula-
tory outcomes requires parties seeking to escape an anti-aggregation
agreement to make an additional, threshold showing of unremedied
wrongdoing.  That showing, however, is analogous to the showing
required at other threshold procedural checkpoints.  And the costs of
demanding a showing of unremedied wrongdoing are offset by the
new approach’s increased accuracy and greater compatibility with
Supreme Court arbitration doctrine.
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I describes the rise of
anti-aggregation agreements and the evolution of the claiming
approach.  Parts II and III describe previously unidentified problems
with the claiming approach and their influence on the Supreme
Court’s troubling decision in Concepcion.  Part IV outlines the basic
features of the outcomes approach, considers how the approach
would operate in practice, and addresses objections.
*  *  *
Before proceeding, two notes about the Article’s scope.  First, I
focus on the issues raised by anti-aggregation agreements, leaving to
one side debates about the general desirability of shifting dispute reso-
lution from public courts to private tribunals.  As a factual matter,
practically all anti-aggregation agreements appear in arbitration
agreements.11  Nevertheless, it is useful to isolate anti-aggregation pro-
visions for analysis, because they raise a different set of concerns than
the general shift to private dispute resolution.
Second, in arguing that the doctrine should focus on an anti-
aggregation agreement’s relationship to significant unremedied
wrongdoing, I do not suggest that this is the only way of invalidating
an anti-aggregation agreement.  Some rights are “fundamentally
defined by their aggregative or public nature,”12 so that enforcement
of an anti-aggregation agreement will eliminate substantive rights.13
11 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 871, 893, 884–85 tbls.3 & 5 (2008).
12 Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 185.
13 See, e.g., In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012 WL 36274, at *1 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 3, 2012)
(No. 12-CA-25764) (concluding that imposition of an anti-aggregation agreement via
an employment agreement is an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act because it interferes with employees’ right to “engage in concerted activities
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In addition, some anti-aggregation agreements cannot be enforced
because they violate generally applicable principles of contract law,
such prohibitions on fraud or misrepresentation.14  The argument
here is that a focus on regulatory outcomes (and not claiming) is the
best general response to the problem of anti-aggregation agreements.
I claim that regulatory outcomes should drive the analysis in the
majority of cases that do not involve features like group rights, fraud,
or misrepresentation.
I. THE CLAIMING APPROACH
As noted, a basic justification for rules authorizing aggregate
claiming invokes aggregation’s potential to facilitate enforcement of
the law.  By holding out a financial incentive for private attorneys to
prosecute wrongdoing, aggregation encourages attorneys to bring law-
suits.  Aggregation thereby creates a market in law enforcement,
which shapes regulated actors’ expectations about the payoff of violat-
ing the law.15  Instead of relying on government enforcement, the law
is enforced through “an infrastructure of private prosecutors who
earn a living, at defendants’ expense, practicing in the relevant area of
law.”16
Building on this logic, the claiming approach reasons that elimi-
nating financial incentives for private attorneys to prosecute wrongdo-
ing will generate harms that justify invalidating an anti-aggregation
agreement.  The approach assumes that too great a reduction in
claiming “prevents the effective vindication of federal rights” or extin-
guishes “the only economically feasible means for enforcing . . . statu-
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Gonnello, 2011 WL 4716617, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011) (No. 11
Civ. 5636(PKC)) (denying demand to arbitrate antirust claim because “[t]he parties
withheld from the arbitrator the power to decide questions that would necessarily
affect the rights of more than the parties to the dispute through the grant of declara-
tory or injunctive relief”); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 394,
408–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying enforcement to anti-aggregation agreement that
barred assertion of pattern-and-practice discrimination claim held jointly by affected
employees).
14 See 17A C.J.S. Contracts §§ 199–226 (2011); see also David Horton, Arbitration as
Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 457 (2011) (noting that the manner in which some
anti-aggregation agreements have been imposed violates the “preexisting duty” rule
because no consideration passes in exchange for a new restriction on the availability
of aggregation).
15 See supra text and sources accompanying note 3. R
16 SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAW-
SUITS IN THE U.S. 31 (2010).
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tory rights.”17  The approach remedies this problem by requiring that
anti-aggregation agreements honor the incidence and availability of
claiming when aggregation is available.
To explain this approach, it is necessary to briefly review the
Supreme Court’s current understanding of the FAA, the efforts of the
corporate defense bar to leverage the Act into a protection against
aggregate litigation, and the judicial response to those efforts.  My pri-
mary argument in this Part is descriptive.  In reviewing the evolution
of the claiming approach, I hope to show that although they differ in
superficial respects, the dominant responses to anti-aggregation
agreements in the doctrine and scholarship are fundamentally con-
cerned with the same phenomenon: an agreement’s effect on
claiming.18
17 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex II), 634 F.3d 187, 198 (2d Cir. 2011).
18 Although this Article is the first scholarly work to offer a general account of the
claiming approach, it draws heavily on the work of other scholars who have examined
the judicial response to anti-aggregation agreements. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting
out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 373, 391–98 (2006) (predicting that increased recognition of anti-aggregation
agreements will “kill” the modern class action); David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Con-
tract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 605, 630–36 (2010)
(describing use of unilateral contract amendments to restrict contractual remedies);
Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
157, 166–82 (2006) (discussing credit card issuers’ use of National Bank Act to export
favorable state law nationwide and restrict consumer remedies); Nagareda, Aggrega-
tion, supra note 10, at 1895–1909 (proposing that courts analyze anti-aggregation
agreements’ effects on the market for representation of legal claims); Judith Resnik:
Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Tur-
ner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 118–33 (2012) (discussing Supreme Court’s turn
to FAA as a source of dispute resolution law and legal debates in Concepcion).  In
addition to sources discussing anti-aggregation agreements, an enormous literature
considers the Supreme Court’s embrace of arbitration. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P.
Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration
Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1437–39 (2008) (modeling judicial debate over arbitra-
tion in game theoretic terms); Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dis-
pute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1987) (setting out framework for evaluating dispute
resolution systems and concluding that ADR is lacking in many respects); Paul D.
Carrington & Paul H. Haagan, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331 (criti-
quing development of arbitration doctrine through the Supreme Court’s 1995 term);
Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997) (describing procedural safeguards appropriate for arbitra-
tion of employment claims); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New
Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 239 (2012) (arguing that “through a series of poorly-reasoned
decisions,” the Supreme Court has endorsed the use of arbitration to eliminate
accountability for wrongdoing); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostil-
ity to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 1097 (2006) (describing the embrace of arbitration as a facet of the Rehnquist
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A. Restricting Aggregation Through Contract—Doctrinal Foundations
Anti-aggregation agreements are found predominantly in agree-
ments to arbitrate disputes.19  Though there does not appear to be a
case on point, a contractual provision restricting aggregation outside
the context of an arbitration agreement would conflict with the fed-
eral class action rule and perhaps be disregarded for that reason.20
The FAA, however, gives private parties great authority to regulate
procedure in the context of agreements to arbitrate.
The operative provision of the Act, Section 2, provides that an
arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.”21  For most of the twentieth century, the FAA was
understood to neither apply in state court nor permit the arbitration
of statutory claims.22  But beginning in 1983, the Supreme Court
embarked on an ambitious reinterpretation of the Act that greatly
expanded its scope.23  Among other things, the Court held that (1)
the Act creates a federal right to enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments which preempts state law;24 (2) Section 2 applies in state courts
notwithstanding the many provisions of the Act that regulate federal
Court’s general hostility to litigation).  My focus here is on contractual restrictions on
aggregation, thus I leave to one side debates about other effects of privatizing dispute
resolution.
19 See, e.g., Eisenberg et al., supra note 11, at 884–85 tbls.3 & 5 (analyzing the R
pattern of class action waivers in contracts with arbitration clauses).
20 The precise question presented by such a provision is whether Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 is subject to ex ante waiver by a private litigant, or is a non-waive-
able rule governing the processing of claims in federal court. Cf. Shady Grove Ortho-
pedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) (holding that Rule
23 takes precedence over conflicting state rule because Rule 23 “creates a categorical
rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a
class action”).
21 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
22 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437–38 (1953) (rejecting demand for
arbitration of claims under the Securities Exchange Act); Julius Henry Cohen & Ken-
neth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 275–76 (1926)
(“[The FAA] rests upon the constitutional provision by which Congress is authorized
and to establish and control inferior Federal courts. . . .  It is no infringement of the
right of each State to decide for itself what contracts shall or shall not exist under its
laws.”).
23 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (interpreting § 2 to establish “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the con-
trary” and “create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any
arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act”).
24 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687–88 (1996).
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court procedure;25 and (3) virtually any cause of action can be subject
to an ex ante agreement to arbitrate.26
The Court’s new understanding is premised on the view that arbi-
tration merely changes the forum in which claiming occurs, and thus
does not affect the parties’ legal entitlements or the deterrent and
remedial functions of the law.  In the first decision recognizing the
arbitrability of statutory rights, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., the Court wrote that “so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deter-
rent function.”27  “By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim,” the
Court explained, “a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbi-
tral, rather than a judicial, forum.”28  As Professor Richard Nagareda
observed, “the repetition of this language in the Court’s FAA case law
has turned [it] into something of a mantra.”29
At the same time the Supreme Court was expanding the scope of
the FAA, the corporate defense bar was mobilizing against the
expanded use of class actions made possible by the 1966 amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Those amendments famously
authorized class-action proceedings where “questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members,”30 leading to increased use of aggregation
in many areas of the law.31  Given increased liability exposure in
aggregate proceedings, it was “only a matter of time” before the
defense bar attempted to leverage the FAA to limit clients’ susceptibil-
ity to aggregate litigation.32  In the late 1980s,33 corporations began
redrafting standard form contracts regulating the relationship
25 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12–16 (1984).
26 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (regarding
arbitration implicating the Truth in Lending Act); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (regarding arbitration implicating the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240
(1987) (regarding arbitration implicating the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
RICO).
27 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).
28 Id. at 628.
29 Nagareda, Aggregation, supra note 10, at 1897. R
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
31 See generally Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth,
Reality, and “the Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 664–66 (1979) (describing
growth of, and backlash against, class actions in federal court).
32 Nagareda, Aggregation, supra note 10, at 1898 (“The rise of mandatory arbitra- R
tion coincided roughly with the emergence of class action litigation as a subject of
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between the buyer and seller of mass-market products to require not
only binding arbitration of disputes, but also that arbitration occur on
a one-on-one basis.34  And thus, the anti-aggregation agreement was
born.
B. First Generation Restrictions and the Meaning of “Arbitration”
As the product of contract, the design of an anti-aggregation
agreement is limited only by the ingenuity of the company that devises
it, the company’s ability to secure “assent” by bundling the agreement
with a good or service demanded by the market, and legal limits on
parties’ authority over dispute-resolution procedure.  Even so, three
distinct generations of anti-aggregation agreements are recognized in
the literature.35
First generation agreements limited aggregation almost by acci-
dent, providing that the parties agreed to “arbitrate” disputes without
addressing the availability of aggregate proceedings one way or the
other.36  Although concerns about unremedied wrongdoing lurked in
the background, the primary issue courts addressed when asked to
enforce such agreements was one of contract interpretation: Does a
bare reference to “arbitration” necessarily contemplate one-on-one
proceedings, or does it also encompass proceedings in which the
claims of multiple parties are resolved?  Courts divided, with some
holding that a court cannot order class arbitration “absent an express
concern to corporate America.  It would be only a matter of time before businesses
would put two and two together.”).
33 The earliest decision I am aware of which addressed an argument that an arbi-
tration agreement precluded use of the class action device is Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc. v. Valenzuela Bock, 696 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), abrogated by Vaden v. Discover
Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009).
34 Nagareda, Aggregation, supra note 10, at 1898. R
35 See Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial
Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal
Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 503–09 (2009); Richard A. Nagareda,
The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069,
1106 (2011).
36 For example, the agreement at issue in the landmark Seventh Circuit decision
recognizing the enforceability of “shrinkwrap” contracts, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), provided: “Any dispute or controversy arising out of or
relating to [this] Agreement or its interpretation shall be settled exclusively and
finally by arbitration.  The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.”
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 1996 WL 650631, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 1996) (No. 96 C
4086).
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provision in the parties’ arbitration agreement providing for [it],”37
and others holding to the contrary.38
Perhaps because the meaning of “arbitration” is seemingly a ques-
tion of state contract law, the Supreme Court did not enter the fray till
2010, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.39  There, the
Court held that the FAA establishes a federal default rule in favor of
one-on-one proceedings, according to which “arbitration” means
“one-on-one arbitration” absent a basis in the parties’ agreement or
state law for thinking otherwise.40  Relying on snippets of prior opin-
ions and the general purposes of the FAA, the majority opined that
“class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a
degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by sim-
ply agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.”41
C. Second Generation Restrictions and the Rise of the Claiming Approach
Although Stolt-Nielsen is a puzzling decision,42 its significance for
anti-aggregation doctrine is limited.  That is because, by the time the
case was handed down, anti-aggregation agreements had evolved.
Rather than relying on the definition of “arbitration” to exclude
aggregation, second generation agreements expressly rule it out.  For
example, Citibank’s Checking Plus Account Agreement purports to
exclude customers from bringing claims via a class action, in a private
attorney general capacity, or simply in combination with other cus-
37 Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 276–77 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (11th Cir.
1989) (holding class arbitration may not be ordered in the absence of an express
provision); Med Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998) (“We conclude
that to require class-wide arbitration would alter the agreements of the parties, whose
arbitration agreements do not provide for class-wide arbitration.”).
38 See, e.g., Keating v. Superior Court of Alameda Cnty., 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal.
1982), rev’d in part on other grounds, Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984);
Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 865 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
39 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
40 Id. at 1773–75.
41 Id. at 1775.
42 Like Concepcion, Stolt-Nielson is striking for its inability to cite authority for the
understanding of arbitration it adopts and the casual manner in which it federalizes
basic questions of contract interpretation.  It is also notable for ignoring the defen-
dant’s concession that the agreement under review could be read to allow arbitration,
an example of larger phenomena described in Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding
Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 693–705
(2012). See Stolt-Nielson, 130 S. Ct. at 1765 (“The parties entered into a supplemental
agreement providing for the question of class arbitration to be submitted to a panel
of three arbitrators.”).
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tomers involved in the same dispute.43  Under the literal terms of the
agreement, an action in which all relevant parties are joined cannot
be maintained if the bank accidentally credits A for a deposit by B, or
C undertakes to pay D’s obligations and fails to do so.44
Second generation agreements prompted a number of decisions
that addressed the conflict between restrictions on aggregation and
aggregation’s claim-enabling function.  One group of decisions main-
tained the conflict was of no consequence, because the FAA required
enforcement of any procedural limitations in an agreement to arbi-
trate.45  I set these to one side, because they offer no theory for when
procedural limitations in an arbitration agreement are permissible;
taken to their logical extreme, such decisions would allow dispute res-
olution by magic eight ball or mortal combat, provided it is required
by an “arbitration agreement.”  A second group of decisions, which I
focus upon, considered the relationship between anti-aggregation
agreements and the viability of private regulatory enforcement, and
invalidated anti-aggregation agreements with too great an effect on
the incidence or availability of claiming.  The most important deci-
sions were delivered by the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank
v. Superior Court46 and the Second Circuit in In re American Express Liti-
gation.47  Although the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Discover Bank in
Concepcion, one must understand both Discover Bank and American
Express to understand the evolution of the claiming approach.
Discover Bank involved a second generation anti-aggregation
agreement the bank imposed on holders of the Discover Card, which
provided that “neither you nor we shall be entitled to join or consoli-
date claims in arbitration by or against other cardmembers with
43 See supra text and sources accompanying note 2. R
44 Id.
45 For example, the Third Circuit’s decision in Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225
F.3d 366, 369, 373 (3d Cir. 2000), rejected a challenge to a provision that required
one-on-one arbitration of claims under the Truth in Lending Act, on the ground that
nothing in the Act evinced Congress’s intention to preserve the availability of class-
action claiming.  For similar decisions, see, e.g., James v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d
672, 675, 677 (7th Cir. 2005); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 926
(N.D. 2005).
46 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
47 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex I), 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, judgment vacated sub nom., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct.
2401 (2010), aff’d on remand, In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex II), 634 F.3d 187
(2d Cir. 2011), aff’d, In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204 (2d
Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc denied, In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex IV), 651 F.3d
139 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.
Ct. 594.  For a summary of American Express’s procedural history, see infra note 57.
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respect to other accounts, or arbitrate any claim as a representative or
member of a class or in a private attorney general capacity.”48
Cardmembers sought to bring suit against Discover in California court
asserting a classic negative-value claim.49  The bank, plaintiffs alleged,
imposed a twenty-nine dollar late fee on customers who paid their bill
after one p.m. on the date payment was due, without a legal basis for
the charge.50  Because no one would hire an attorney to prosecute a
twenty-nine dollar claim, plaintiffs sought to represent a class of simi-
larly situated cardholders.  The bank moved to dismiss the suit in lieu
of one-on-one arbitration.51
The California Supreme Court ruled that the anti-aggregation
agreement was unconscionable as a matter of California contract law,
because it destroyed the financial incentive for class-action lawyers to
seek out and prosecute wrongdoing.  Because “damages in consumer
cases are often small . . . ‘the class action is often the only effective way
to halt and redress . . . exploitation.’”52  While “[c]lass action and arbi-
tration waivers are not, in the abstract, exculpatory clauses,”53 such
waivers eliminated the “only” effective means of enforcing the law,
exculpating the bank from liability for wrongdoing.
Based on its analysis of the Discover agreement, the court set out
a general test for when a class-action waiver would not be enforced.
Under it, the dispositive facts were that (1) the waiver was found “in a
consumer contract of adhesion,” (2) “in a setting in which disputes
between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of
damages,” and (3) the party challenging the agreement alleged that
the protected party carried out “a scheme to deliberately cheat large
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money[.]”54
Thus stated, the holding of Discover Bank looked less like a judi-
cial decision than a statutory rule.  Rather than concluding that the
48 Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1103 (capitalization normalized).  The agreement
also provided that Delaware law would govern disputes between customers and the
bank, an example of the exportation of state law authorized by the National Bank Act.
See Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 18, at 159–66.  The California Supreme Court R
did not decide whether California law applied to claims of California cardholders,
though it strongly implied that application of California law was necessary to vindicate
the state’s public policy. See Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1118.
49 As used in the law-and-economics literature, a “negative value” claim is one in
which the costs of litigating the claim are greater than the potential judgment. BONE,
supra note 3, at 34. R
50 Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1104.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1108–09 (citing Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. 2 P.3d 27, 38 (Cal. 2000)).
53 Id. at 1108.
54 Id. at 1110.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 14  4-FEB-13 12:46
662 notre dame law review [vol. 88:2
agreement before it had impermissible effects, Discover Bank estab-
lished a rule which invalidated any agreement satisfying the court’s
three criteria.55  In contrast, the other major judicial response to sec-
ond generation agreements takes a narrower approach and focuses on
whether an anti-aggregation agreement precludes the assertion of par-
ticular, identifiable claims.56  The fullest statement of this approach
appears in the Second Circuit’s decision in American Express.57
That litigation involved a provision of American Express’s agree-
ment for “small” merchants that process up to $10 million in transac-
tions annually, which requires arbitration of disputes and prohibits
merchants from participating in an action “in a representative capac-
ity or as a member of any class of claimants.”58  Several merchants
subject to the agreement alleged that the merchant agreement’s
“Honor All Cards” provision created an illegal product tie by requir-
ing them to accept less profitable credit cards alongside Amex’s tradi-
tional charge card.59  Following the standard script, plaintiffs sought
to avoid the anti-aggregation provision so they could share the costs of
55 See generally Fredrick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455 (1995)
(describing and defending phenomenon of “opinions as rules”).
56 See, e.g., Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1222–24 (11th Cir. 2007); In re
Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 2007); Kristian v. Comcast
Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 56–59 (1st Cir. 2006).
57 American Express has an unusual procedural history.  The original appellate
panel consisted of Circuit Judges Sack, Pooler, and Sotomayor.  After the panel ren-
dered its first decision, In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex I), 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.
2009), Judge Sotomayor was elevated to the Supreme Court.  Amex petitioned for
certiorari, and the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s decision for further
consideration in light of Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758
(2010).  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010).  On
remand, a two judge panel consisting of Judges Sack and Pooler reaffirmed the origi-
nal panel decision. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex II), 634 F.3d 187, 200 (2d
Cir. 2011).  Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion, the panel sua
sponte placed a hold on the mandate to consider the effect of that decision.  Six
months later, the panel’s final decision, Amex III, concluded that Concepcion did not
affect the validity of Amex I and Amex II. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III),
667 F.3d 204, 214–19 (2d Cir. 2012).  In Amex IV, the Court divided evenly on
whether to rehear the case en banc. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex IV), 681
F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012).  The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 133 S. Ct. 594
(2012), and will hear the case on February 27, 2013.
58 Amex I, 554 F.3d at 306 (capitalization normalized).
59 A tie is “an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition
that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he
will not purchase that product from any other supplier.”  Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958).  A tie “violates § 1 of the Sherman Act if the
seller has ‘appreciable economic power’ in the tying product market and if the
arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market.”  Eastman
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 15  4-FEB-13 12:46
2012] anti-aggregation  doctrine 663
claiming.  Amex demanded that their action be dismissed in favor of
one-on-one arbitration.60
Relying on Mitsubishi’s statement that arbitration does not frus-
trate the objectives of the substantive law “so long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum,”61 plaintiffs sought to establish that enforcement of
the anti-aggregation provision would make it prohibitively expensive
for them to assert a tying claim against Amex.  To this end, they intro-
duced evidence from an economist and an attorney, which showed
that due to the expense of hiring expert witnesses, it would cost “at
least several hundred thousand dollars” to assert their claim.62
Because the recovery available to an individual plaintiff was orders of
magnitude smaller, plaintiffs contended that Amex’s agreement pre-
vented “effective vindication” of the statutory cause of action.63
The Court of Appeals agreed and ordered that plaintiffs be per-
mitted to proceed as a class.  It anchored its decision on both Mitsub-
ishi and Congress’s decision to authorize private enforcement of the
Sherman Act.  Where an anti-aggregation provision renders a particu-
lar claim negative value, the court reasoned, the agreement conflicts
with Congress’s decision that there should be “strong private enforce-
ment mechanisms and incentives in the antitrust statutes,” and effec-
tively “grant[s] [the protected company] de facto immunity from
antitrust liability.”64  Despite the claim that enforcement of the anti-
aggregation agreement would effectively immunize Amex from anti-
trust liability, the court did not consider the extent to which Amex is
subject to other enforcement mechanisms.65  Nor did it consider
whether Amex had, in the case before it, violated the law.  Instead,
underscoring importance of claiming to its analysis, the court opined
that if the class-action waiver were enforced, Amex would be shielded
from liability “even where it may have violated the antitrust laws.”66
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992) (citing Fortner Enters.,
Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)).
60 Amex I, 554 F.3d at 308.
61 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
(1985).
62 Amex I, 554 F.3d at 316.
63 Id. at 315–16.
64 Id. at 320 (quoting Brief for Am. Antitrust Institute at 15).
65 See id. at 315–20.
66 Id. at 320 (quoting Brief for Am. Antitrust Institute at 15 (emphasis added)).
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D. Third Generation Restrictions and the Market for Legal Representation
Third generation anti-aggregation agreements respond to the
concern that restricting aggregation will eliminate all claiming by
coupling strict restrictions on aggregation with incentives to bring suit
in an individual capacity.  The state-of-the-art is the agreement at issue
in Concepcion, which was designed by AT&T and imposed on
cellphone customers via AT&T’s Wireless Service Agreement.67  As a
statistical matter, approximately a quarter of the readership of this
Article is subject to that agreement.68
The AT&T agreement mandates one-on-one arbitration of dis-
putes and prohibits class actions and other forms of aggregate litiga-
tion.  Yet it also provides that AT&T will pay all costs of arbitration
unless the arbitrator determines an action is frivolous, and makes
available a $7,500 premium—plus double attorneys’ fees—if the arbi-
trator awards relief in excess of AT&T’s last settlement offer prior to
the selection of arbitrators.69  For the individual claimant, the agree-
ment makes pursuing a claim a lucrative undertaking.  A $100 claim
litigated to judgment can result in a $7,600 award against AT&T, with
AT&T paying double the claimant’s attorneys’ fees.
Why would a profit-maximizing corporation provide outsized
incentives for individuals to assert claims against it?  The answer
involves the possibility that by doing so, the corporation could also
eliminate plaintiff-favoring features of aggregate litigation through
the aggregation ban.  If enforced, that ban eliminates the cost-spread-
ing aggregation permits,70 increases search costs for would-be claim-
ants,71 and frustrates the development of plaintiff-side expertise.72
The logic—and likely objective—of third generation agreements is to
67 Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom.,
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
68 See, e.g., comScore Reports March 2010 U.S. Mobile Subscriber Market Share, COM-
SCORE INC. (May 6, 2010), http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/
2010/5/comScore_Reports_March_2010_U.S._Mobile_Subscriber_Market_Share.
69 Brief for Petitioner at 6–7, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011) (No. 09-893).  Since the lower courts’ decisions in Concepcion, the premium
has been raised to $10,000. See id.
70 See supra text accompanying note 3. R
71 Cf. Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and
the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1586 (2007) (“In the
class action, absent parties traditionally remain passive, ceding the control of litiga-
tion strategy to those who serve as named parties.”).
72 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98 (1974) (observing that repeat litigants
“develop expertise,” “have ready access to specialists,” and “enjoy economies of scale
and enjoy low start-up costs for any case”).
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diminish the defendant’s net liability exposure by restricting claimant-
favoring features of aggregate litigation, all while rebutting the con-
tention that the agreement eliminates claiming entirely.73  Stated dif-
ferently, agreements such as AT&T’s reflect a bet that the settlements,
judgments, premium payments, and attorneys’ fee awards that result
from encouraging individuals to sue will be less than the company’s
liability exposure if aggregation is permitted.74
No court decision has fully explored the legal implications of that
bet.75  When AT&T’s third generation agreement was challenged in
California federal court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that its validity
was controlled by Discover Bank, even though Discover Bank involved a
second generation agreement that eliminated claiming entirely rather
than suppressing it through a “plaintiff-friendly” arbitration agree-
ment.  The court predicted that AT&T would simply settle claims to
avoid paying the $7,500 premium,76 and ruled that this doomed the
agreement because it destroyed the incentive for class action lawyers
73 Further evidence that the purpose of third generation anti-aggregation agree-
ments is to suppress claiming can be found in the fact that agreements to arbitrate are
disproportionately used in consumer contracts, notwithstanding the broad applicabil-
ity of the reasons corporations give for favoring arbitration. See Eisenberg et al., supra
note 11, at 893 (concluding from study of varying use of arbitration clauses across R
contracts within the same firms that “consumer arbitration clauses are used as means
for avoiding aggregate dispute resolution”).  There is also anecdotal evidence that
corporate actors impose mandatory bilateral arbitration to suppress claiming. See,
e.g., Class Action Bans in Arbitration Pacts Could Create Limits on Substantive Rights, 72
U.S.L.W. 2294 (2003) (reporting a Mayer Brown lawyer’s statement that he advises
employers to impose aggregation agreements on employees because “you can usually
avoid class actions”); Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action
Shield, 16 FRANCHISE  L. J. 141, 141 (1997) (recommending that franchisors impose
arbitration agreements on franchisees “[s]ince many (and perhaps most) of the puta-
tive class members may never [pursue individual claims], and because arbitrators typi-
cally do not issue runaway awards”).
74 Of course, this can be stated algebraically.  Let Li equal the expected liability
the company faces from individual claiming regardless of incentives to sue, Li*, the
expected liability the company faces if it provides incentives for individual claiming,
La, the expected liability the company faces if aggregation is permitted, and P the
probability that the agreement will be upheld.  Adoption of a third generation agree-
ment is cost-justified when Li + Li* + 1-P(La) > Li + La.  When Li is zero because indi-
vidual claims are negative value, adoption of a third generation agreements is cost
effective when Li* + 1-P(La) > La.
75 A possible exception is the district court opinion in Concepcion, Laster v. T-
Mobile USA, Inc., 2008 WL 5216255, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008) (No. 05cv1167
DMS (AJB)).  That opinion, however, turned primarily on the district court’s under-
standing of California law, not the broader effects of enforcing the agreement.
76 Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2009).
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to seek out violations of the law.77  When the Supreme Court reviewed
the Ninth Circuit’s decision, it did not focus on the AT&T agreement.
Instead, the Court addressed the very different question of whether
the Discover Bank rule in its entirety was preempted by the FAA, and
held that it was.78  The Court reasoned that while that rule did not
formally mandate the availability of class-wide arbitration, “it allows
any party to a consumer contract to demand it”—a result “inconsis-
tent with the FAA” because it interferes with the Act’s policy of pro-
moting “streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.”79  The
Court’s discussion of the AT&T agreement’s effects was limited to a
brief rebuttal of the dissent’s argument “that class proceedings are
necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip
through the legal system.”80  This argument did not save Discover Bank
from preemption, the majority concluded, because “States cannot
require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA,” and “the claim
here was most unlikely to go unresolved.”81
Although no court has explored the implications of a third gener-
ation agreement, a proposal by Professor Nagareda suggests the con-
tours of a claim-based analysis.82  Nagareda’s proposal is
characteristically nuanced, but its crux is that in determining whether
an anti-aggregation agreement is enforceable, courts should focus on
how the agreement affects the market for representation of legal
claims.83
Nagareda begins by noting the mantra that arbitration will not
disrupt the remedial and deterrent schemes created by Congress so
long as arbitration allows effective vindication of statutory rights.84
From this, he concludes that the key limitation on anti-aggregation
agreements is that they respect the institutional role of Congress, and
particularly Congress’s decision to authorize private enforcement of a
statutory scheme: “The legitimacy of the arbitral forum . . . stems from
the premise that an arbitration clause lacks the power to alter preex-
isting rights in the manner of reform legislation.”85  An agreement
77 Id.
78 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (“Because it
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress,’ . . . California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA.”
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).
79 Id. at 1749–51 (citations omitted).
80 Id. at 1753.
81 Id.
82 See Nagareda, Aggregation, supra note 10.
83 See id. at 1901.
84 See id. at 1897.
85 Id. at 1901.
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violates this limitation when “the waivers in nominally private con-
tracts take on a public, law-reform dimension, effectively writing out
of substantive law the notion of private enforcement.”86
How do we know if an agreement takes on “a public, law-reform
dimension”?  Nagareda proposes that “courts . . . examine carefully
the framework for the bringing of claims on an individual basis [and]
specifically, the financial arrangements to do so in the absence of
aggregation.”87  The “central question” in this analysis “is whether the
unavailability of aggregation would reduce the potential upside [to
plaintiffs’ counsel] to such a degree as to demonstrate a ‘likelihood’
that lawyers will not represent claimants.”88  Where some claiming
remains possible—as with third generation agreements that provide
reasonable incentives for individual claiming—the agreement may be
enforced.  But where an agreement makes all claiming negative value,
it cannot be enforced because it “write[s] private enforcement out of
the underlying statute.”89
Though Nagareda’s analysis is premised on the legislative deci-
sion to permit private enforcement, he does not explain why the deci-
sion to create a private right of action should be equated with
individual as opposed to aggregate claiming or why, when Congress
creates a private right of action, it should be understood to be speak-
ing to the financial relationship between a claimant and her attorney.
He does not indicate what kind of legal representation an anti-aggre-
gation agreement must allow, despite the significant differences
between lawyers that represent individual claims and major plaintiffs’
firms.  Nor does he link his analysis to any particular statute that
authorizes private regulatory enforcement.  Rather, like the judicial
response to first and second generation restrictions on aggregation,
the dispositive consideration is an agreement’s effect on claiming.
While analysis of anti-aggregation agreements “calls for nuanced treat-
ment sensitive to context,”90 the bottom line is whether an agreement
permits claiming with the benefit of counsel.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CLAIMING APPROACH
As the prior Part describes, the fundamental value vindicated by
the claiming approach is preserving claiming.  Despite superficial dif-
ferences in the tests promulgated by courts and commentators, all
86 Id. at 1902.
87 Id. at 1904.
88 Id. at 1905 (citations omitted).
89 Id. at 1904.
90 Id. at 1896.
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forms of the claiming approach are remarkably consistent when con-
sidered from a functional perspective.  At bottom, the approach asks,
“What effect does an agreement have on claiming?”  Too great an
effect—too little claiming (whether in an arbitral or judicial forum)—
and an anti-aggregation agreement is not enforced.
This Part and the next outline previously unidentified problems
with this approach and consider their consequences for judicial regu-
lation of anti-aggregation agreements.  A threshold problem involves
the legal basis for the claiming approach.  All versions of the approach
require a particular level of claiming: Discover Bank, the level that
prevails in public court; Amex, claiming that is financially practical;
and the “market for representation” standard the level that prevails if
there is a viable market for individual legal representation.91  But the
argument that the law ever requires a particular level of claiming is
tenuous.
The more important problems have to do with how the claiming
approach implements the concerns it is motivated by.  At bottom, doc-
trines that follow the claiming approach are concerned with the
potential that anti-aggregation agreements will permit unchecked
wrongdoing.  Where competition between sellers fails to regulate dis-
pute resolution procedure, the fear is that anti-aggregation agree-
ments will eliminate an essential deterrent mechanism and lead to
unremedied violation of the law.92  Yet by focusing on claiming instead
of regulatory outcomes, the analysis sweeps both too broadly and not
broadly enough.  Too broadly, because strong forms of the analysis
(e.g., Discover Bank) invalidate agreements that have no substantial
effect on regulatory compliance.  Not broadly enough, because weak
forms of the analysis (e.g., the market for representation standard)
91 See infra Part II.A.
92 There is a rich literature on the reasons why competition may fail to provide
adequate regulation of non-salient contractual terms. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduc-
tion by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1388–1394 (2004) (describing competitive
dynamics that encourage exploitative pricing mechanisms in credit card agreements);
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1222–24, 1288–89 (2003) (arguing that buyers of mass-market
goods and products are rationally indifferent to non-salient contractual terms and
proposing that courts substitute penalty terms for terms that exploit buyer igno-
rance).  Here, I assume market failure in at least some areas where anti-aggregation
agreements are employed, and that generalist courts are incapable of conducting reli-
able economic analyses of the relevant market every time an anti-aggregation agree-
ment is challenged. Cf. id. at 1285 (“Judicial determinations of which contract terms
are efficient and which terms are inefficient are subject to a high likelihood of
error.”).
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permit extensive, unremedied wrongdoing so long as a modicum of
claiming is preserved.
None of these problems is necessarily fatal.  Nearly all laws are
over- or under-inclusive relative to their justification and there are cir-
cumstances in which imprecise tailoring helps to accomplish the
objectives of the law.93  But in view of the Supreme Court’s preference
for private dispute resolution, an exclusive focus on claiming works
serious mischief.  The claiming approach rejects anti-aggregation
agreements in the absence of clear legal authority or demonstrated
harms, based on conclusions about the relationship between claiming,
corporate wrongdoing, and compliance that turn out to be surpris-
ingly speculative.  That, in turn, leads to doctrinal incoherence.
A. Baseline Problems
The initial difficulty with the claiming approach involves the base-
line it uses to determine the validity of an anti-aggregation agreement.
All versions of the claiming approach reject agreements that do not
preserve a particular level of claiming.  They fail to show, however,
that any level of claiming is required by law.
To simplify the discussion, I take as an example the American
Express decisions discussed in Part I.C.94  In defense of its anti-aggrega-
tion provision, Amex pointed out that the Clayton Act, which creates a
private right of action to enforce the antitrust laws, provides expert
and attorneys’ fees to successful litigants.95  Amex’s arbitration agree-
ment did not alter these statutory incentives, thus the company
argued that its one-on-one arbitration agreement was consistent with
Congress’s judgment regarding the appropriate incentives to sue.
The Second Circuit rejected the argument because it thought the
fees provided by Congress did too little to encourage claiming.  The
court reasoned that the forty dollar per diem for expert witnesses
under the Clayton Act was “not going to pay for the expert fees [the
plaintiffs’ expert] estimated will be necessary to make an individual
plaintiff’s case . . . .”96  And “[e]ven with respect to reasonable attor-
ney’s fees, which are shifted under § 4 of the Clayton Act, the plaintiffs
must include the risk of losing, and thereby not recovering any fees, in their
93 See Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1507–12
(2008); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
67–68 (1983).
94 See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. R
95 See In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex I), 554 F.3d 300, 317 (2d Cir. 2009).
96 Id.
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evaluation of their suit’s potential costs.”97  The court thus seems to have
assumed that the plaintiff-side incentives to sue that prevail under the
patchwork of procedural rules and statutes that govern in public court
hold the status of prescriptive law, or at least a baseline from which
too much deviation is not tolerated.
As a threshold matter, the court’s reasoning is puzzling because
the Clayton Act was enacted prior to the invention of the modern class
action in 1966.  More recent statutes, such as the Truth in Lending
Act, reflect Congress’s expectation that class action litigation will be
available to enforce the statute’s commands.98  But the Clayton Act
merely provides that “any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sus-
tained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”99
Enacted in 1914, there is no indication that Congress saw class action
litigation as an essential component of the antitrust enforcement
framework.
More fundamentally, the legal authorities the court invoked for
the proposition that claiming must be cost-effective do not say that.
As noted above, the court relied on two authorities: the Supreme
Court’s statement in Mitsubishi that “so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deter-
rent function,”100 and Congress’s decision to allow private enforce-
ment of the Sherman Act.  Neither, however, speaks to the cost-
effectiveness of private claiming.
The Court’s statement in Mitsubishi must be read in light of the
fact that the rules which govern proceedings in public court generally
leave parties where they are, neither guaranteeing the cost-effective-
ness of claiming on the one hand nor using the cost of process to
deter litigation on the other.  For example, the “American rule” of
attorneys’ fees holds that “attorney’s fees are not ordinarily recover-
able in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing
97 Id. at 318 (emphasis added); accord In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex
III), 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir. 2012).
98 See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V) (specifying allowable damages
and formula for calculating damages in certain class actions); S. REP. NO. 94-590, at 8
(1976) (noting, in amendments to Truth in Lending Act, that “[t]he chief enforce-
ment tool will continue to be private actions for actual damages and civil penalties”).
99 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006 & Supp. V).
100 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
(1985).
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therefor.”101  Where not modified by statute, the rule makes countless
claims negative value, because the cost of hiring an attorney exceeds
the expected judgment.
Because of the neutrality toward claiming reflected in ordinary
procedural rules, it is difficult to understand the Supreme Court’s
statement about “effective” vindication of rights as a mandate that
claiming be cost-effective.  That interpretation would not only work a
significant change in federal procedure, but place parties subject to
an anti-aggregation agreement at an advantage to litigants in the ordi-
nary courts, since only parties subject to an anti-aggregation agree-
ment would be guaranteed cost-effective claiming.  Moreover, statutes
providing attorneys’ fees, damage multipliers, and other incentives to
sue would become superfluous, because lawsuits would already be sub-
ject to a cost-effectiveness requirement.
Another way of approaching the problem is to consider the fac-
tors that influence the economics of claiming.  The desirability of
asserting a claim at any point in time depends on the currently appli-
cable procedural rules, the cost and availability of litigation financing,
and the remedies available if liability is established.  But these things
are not static.  Changes in procedural rules make it easier or more
difficult for claimants to win;102 changes in the capitalization and
structure of plaintiff-side firms affect the availability of financing;103
and changes in remedies affect the judgments claimants can expect to
recover.104  There is no obvious reason for privileging the incentives
to sue that obtain under any combination of these factors, yet this is
exactly what the court’s decision requires.
101 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967);
see also  Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) (“The general practice of
the United States is in oposition [sic] to [awarding the prevailing party attorneys’ fees];
and even if that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the
respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute.”).
102 Consider, for example, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), which was enacted with the twin purposes of “mak[ing] it
harder  for  plaintiffs’ counsel to ‘game the system’ by trying to defeat diversity juris-
diction” and “plac[ing] the determination of more interstate class action lawsuits in
. . . the federal courts.” S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5.
103 See generally Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedu-
ral Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65 (2010) (describing existing financing systems and propos-
ing regulatory reforms to facilitate a robust litigation-finance market).
104 Consider, for example, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (as amended
by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005), 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) (2006), which
imposes a statutory penalty of $500 per fax on anyone who sends an unsolicited fax
advertisement.
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That leaves Congress’s decision to permit private enforcement to
support the court’s judgment.  But here, the court overreads the
authorities.  For the reasons just explained, the mere creation of a
statutory cause of action cannot be understood to require that claim-
ing be cost-effective.  And the other incentives to sue established by
statute—such as attorneys’ fees under the Clayton Act—are preserved
by Amex’s anti-aggregation agreement.
Focusing on particular claims that become negative value because
of an anti-aggregation agreement changes the frame within which
these problems arise, but does not remedy them. American Express rea-
soned that “forcing plaintiffs to bring their claims individually . . .
would make it impossible to enforce their rights under the Sherman
Act and thus conflict with congressional purposes manifested in the
provision of a private right of action in the statute.”105  However, this
kind of “conflict” with Congress’s purposes exists any time plaintiffs
intend to rely on sufficiently expensive experts, regardless of whether
the claim is subject to an anti-aggregation agreement.  Moreover, the
court nowhere explained how Congress mandated that it be cost-effec-
tive to pursue particular claims, or how its analysis could be reconciled
with Congress’s decision to provide financing mechanisms inadequate
to pay for the plaintiffs’ preferred experts.  Conceding that “the Sher-
man Act does not provide plaintiffs with an express right to bring
their claims as a class in court,” the best the court could offer was the
tautology, “[e]radicating the private enforcement component from
our antitrust law scheme cannot be what Congress intended when it
included strong private enforcement mechanisms and incentives in
the antitrust statutes.”106
B. Addressing Unremedied Wrongdoing—Overbreadth
The claiming approach’s assumption that the law requires a par-
ticular level of claiming has a tenuous legal basis.  But that does not
mean that the approach is necessarily misguided.  Perhaps the claim-
ing approach’s insistence on preserving a particular level of claiming
can be justified on the ground that doing so is necessary to ensuring
compliance with the law.
Without doubt, there are circumstances in which private claiming
is essential to compliance.  In the era of Madoff and AIG, it is hard to
imagine a public official expending resources to enforce the Junk Fax
105 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204, 213 n.5 (2012).
106 Id. at 213 n.5, 218.
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Prevention Act of 2005,107 which expresses our profound national
commitment to “provid[ing] all individuals with fax machines . . . pro-
tections from unsolicited senders of unsolicited faxes, and an oppor-
tunity to opt out of receiving future unsolicited faxes from them.”108
But it is logically dubious to conclude from this that a particular level
of claiming is essential to compliance with most statutory schemes.
The problem is threefold.
(1) Varying deterrent effects—First, the deterrent effect of private
claiming is not uniform.  Some norms are widely observed in the
absence of private claiming,109 others are widely observed despite gen-
erating significant claiming,110 and still others are widely violated
while generating widespread claiming.111  To assume a decrease in
compliance from a mere decrease in claiming, private claiming must
be known to serve a deterrent function.  But no form of the claiming
approach is premised on such a showing.
(2) The connection between wrongdoing and claiming—Relatedly, vio-
lations of the law in the real world do not necessarily result in claim-
ing.  As a leading observer explains, “the arrival of matters at the
doors of lawyers and courts is a late stage in an extended process by
which the dispute has crystallized out of the sea of proto-disputes.”112
“Changes in perceptions of harm, in attributions of responsibility, in
expectations of redress, [and] in readiness to be assertive . . . all . . .
affect the number of grievances, claim and disputes.”113
107 Pub. L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat 359 (2005) (amending the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000)).
108 S. REP. NO. 76, at 9 (2005).  A docket search confirms that no actions were
brought by public agencies in federal court for violation of the Junk Fax Act in calen-
dar year 2010. See BloombergLaw Docket Search (Feb. 2, 2012) (on file with Notre
Dame Law Review).
109 For an example, recall the rule that cars must drive on the right side of the
road.
110 For an example, recall trademark protections; despite highly visible disputes
over particular marks, most marks are respected most of the time.
111 See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (describing persistence of “second genera-
tion” forms of workplace discrimination even as overt discrimination against women
and people of color has diminished in response to employment discrimination litiga-
tion); see also Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality?  Against the Universal Turn in Workplace
Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1228–29 (2011) (describing ways in which prohibitions of
sexual harassment perpetuate workplace discrimination).
112 Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
Rev. 4, 12 (1983).
113 Id. at 18.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 26  4-FEB-13 12:46
674 notre dame law review [vol. 88:2
These intuitions are formalized in the well-known literature on
the economics of litigation and settlement, which attempts to identify
conditions in which claimants will bring suit rather than settle or
abandon claims.114  One of that literature’s central insights is that the
study of litigated cases “discloses very little about how legal rules affect
the behavior of those subject to them or affect the generation of legal
disputes themselves.”115  Instead, the literature hypothesizes that the
fact of claiming typically reflects non-merits factors, such as parties’
inability to agree on the value of a claim, unequal access to informa-
tion, differential stakes, or hubris.116  The problem this poses for the
claiming approach is simple: if the fact of claiming is not a good indi-
cator of primary behavior, it is difficult to see why the law should
demand any level of claiming.
(3) The effect of alternate law enforcement mechanisms—Lastly, as cor-
porate defendants are fond of pointing out, claiming may be superflu-
ous if other enforcement mechanisms provide robust enforcement of
the law.  The point is illustrated in many cases testing the enforceabil-
ity of an anti-aggregation agreement.
The plaintiff in these cases typically contends that the agreement
reflects an attempt by the defendant to immunize itself against liability
for wrongdoing.117  The defendant responds by making a display of
114 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Frame-
work with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990); Theodore Eisenberg & Henry
S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J.
ECON. 92 (1997); Bruce L. Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
29 (1995); Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litiga-
tion, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1993); George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothe-
sis: Learning from Wittman’s Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985) (responding to
Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185
(1985)); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis
Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 59–60
(1982).
115 Priest & Klein, supra note 114, at 1. R
116 See, e.g., id. at 39–40 (hypothesizing that fact of litigation reflects legal uncer-
tainty or different stakes between parties to a dispute); Hylton, supra note 114, at 188 R
(hypothesizing an asymmetric access to information); Shavell, supra note 114, at R
59–60 (hypothesizing excessive optimism on the part of plaintiff or defendant).  The
hypothesis that claiming is driven by non-merits factors yields a prediction—that
plaintiffs will prevail in approximately fifty percent of litigated disputes—that has con-
siderable empirical support.  See, e.g., Priest, supra note 114, at 234; Priest & Klein, R
supra note 114, at 31–54. But see Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at R
Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 494 (1996) (concluding that any plaintiff win
rate may be observed if parties have asymmetrical access to information).
117 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 4, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893) (“The agreement . . . allows AT&T to negate the incen-
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the strength, diversity, and effectiveness of other law enforcement
mechanisms it is subject to.  For example, in Concepcion, AT&T touted
the fact that it was subject to oversight by “a whole host of federal and
state agencies—including the Federal Communications Commission,
the Federal Trade Commission, the state attorneys general, and the
state public utility commissions.”118  Aggregate claiming, AT&T
implied, was in no way necessary to guarantee its compliance with the
law; even if claiming is reduced or eliminated, these other actors
would step in.
Courts have not yet worked out a rigorous response to this
debate.119  But for present purposes, what is crucial is the shortcoming
in the claiming approach the debates highlight.  Insofar as that
approach is motivated by a desire to ensure that anti-aggregation
agreements do not permit unremedied wrongdoing, it is incomplete
because it does not account for enforcement of the law through other
mechanisms, at either a general or case-by-case level.
A hypothetical will amplify the point.  Suppose that companies A
and B are headquartered in states Green and Red and compete in the
same national market for a consumer product. A is subject to aggres-
sive oversight by the Attorney General of Green, but industry has cap-
tured state regulators and lawmakers in B’s home state Red.  If both A
and B adopt the same anti-aggregation agreement, the case for invali-
tives that consumers who suspect systemic fraud or deceptive practices might have to
investigate, determine whether they have a legal claim, and prosecute that claim.  It
also effectively eliminates any incentive a lawyer might have to represent such
consumers.”).
118 Brief for Petitioner at 45, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893).
119 Some, such as the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank, insist that claim-
ing always plays a critical enforcement role but fail to substantiate their view. See
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109–10 (Cal. 2005).  Others con-
clude just as casually that no gap in deterrence will result from giving effect to an anti-
aggregation agreement.  For example, a widely cited Third Circuit decision, Johnson v.
West Suburban Bank, rejected the argument that an anti-aggregation agreement frus-
trated the objectives of the Truth in Lending Act, based in part on the theory that
“the statute’s administrative enforcement provisions . . . offer meaningful deterrents to
violators of the TILA if private enforcement actions should fail to fulfill that role.”
225 F.3d 366, 375 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).  The court’s prediction that
“meaningful deterrents” would ensure compliance was based solely on the authority of
federal agencies to enforce the statute; the court did not suggest that any agency had
the capacity to enforce the statute, and the prediction appears to have been flatly
wrong.  The years following Johnson saw massive mortgage fraud by subprime lenders,
which was not deterred by the TILA’s administrative enforcement provisions. See
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 160–64
(2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 28  4-FEB-13 12:46
676 notre dame law review [vol. 88:2
dating B’s agreement would be substantially stronger than the case for
invalidating A’s.  Because of regulatory capture in Red, enforcement
of B’s agreement would lead to a total enforcement gap, allowing
even significant wrongdoing to go without a remedy.  Enforcement of
A’s, however, would merely remove a backstop to the state attorney
general’s efforts.
Analyses that privilege claiming are insensitive to this distinction.
Because both agreements have an identical effect on claiming, they
would stand or fall together.
C. Addressing Unremedied Wrongdoing—Underbreadth
The result of the foregoing problems is overbreadth.  When
claiming does not serve a deterrent function, wrongdoing does not
result in claiming, or alternate remedial mechanisms provide robust
enforcement, the argument that aggregation is essential to policing
compliance with the law breaks down.  But invalidating agreements
that have no substantial effect on compliance is not the only way in
which the claiming approach is poorly tailored.  If only a small level of
claiming is required—as with the market-for-representation approach
advocated by Professor Nagareda—the claiming approach becomes
under-inclusive.  Here, anti-aggregation agreements are enforced even
if they permit widespread wrongdoing, provided they preserve a modi-
cum of individual claiming.120
That is significant, because it is reasonable to expect that in a
non-trivial number of cases, modern anti-aggregation agreements will
make widespread wrongdoing financially attractive.  As detailed
above, third generation agreements reduce the defendant’s overall lia-
bility exposure by prohibiting plaintiff-side cost-spreading, increasing
search costs, and thwarting the development of plaintiff-side exper-
tise, while preserving a modicum of claiming.121  Though they pre-
serve individual claiming, such agreements also create a powerful
incentive to engage in widespread, low-stakes wrongdoing by eliminat-
ing the possibility that it will be fully remedied.
Defenders of the claiming approach might respond that this sim-
ply shows more claiming is needed, to force the defendant to internal-
ize the costs of its behavior.  But if we attempt to implement that
120 See Nagareda, Aggregation, supra note 10, at 1904 (“The real question about a R
given waiver of class-wide arbitration is whether, if enforced, it effectively would write
private enforcement out of the underlying statute.  This question calls for courts to
examine carefully the framework for the bringing of claims on an individual basis
. . . .”).
121 See supra text accompanying notes 71–73.
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suggestion, the claiming approach ceases to supply a judicially man-
ageable standard for evaluating anti-aggregation agreements.  Assum-
ing there are some circumstances in which an agreement may be
honored, a court would need to identify whether a particular agree-
ment is part of the critical mass necessary for effective deterrence to
determine whether it could be enforced.  For fairly obvious reasons,
that question will be difficult for courts to answer.
D. The Role of Private Ordering
A final problem with the claiming approach involves its fit in the
larger body of federal dispute resolution jurisprudence. Ex ante agree-
ments governing dispute resolution procedure are increasingly given
effect by courts.122  This body of law raises difficult questions about
legislative intent and the ability of competition to provide adequate
regulation of dispute resolution procedure.  At the theoretical level,
however, recognition of private procedural ordering is justified by the
same considerations that generally justify giving the force of law to
private promises.  Because each side “attaches its own unique value to
the objects that are exchanged,” enforcing promises improves welfare
in the long run.123  If a market is competitive, this holds even if agree-
ments are not individually negotiated, as with standard-form contracts
of adhesion.124
The difficulty this raises for claim-based analyses is that they do
not incorporate a theory of the circumstances in which private order-
ing should be respected.  The claiming approach does not demand a
showing of buyer exploitation, competitive dynamics likely to produce
inefficient contract terms, or other forms of market failure.125
Instead, it singles out the right to assert claims with others and holds
that in broad categories of cases, that right is not a proper subject of
exchange.  That is puzzling, because at least some of the interests
commonly vindicated through aggregate litigation—such as the
enforcement of contractual obligations—are quintessentially private
entitlements widely recognized to be proper subjects to private
122 Professor Henry Noyes catalogs rights that have been found subject to private
modification or waiver, including constitutional “due process” rights, the Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury, rules of evidence, and procedural rules governing
discovery and settlement.  Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts
to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579,
599–612 (2006).
123 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR CLASSICAL
LIBERALISM 42 (2003).
124 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 116 (6th ed. 2003).
125 Cf. Korobkin, supra note 92, at 1279–85. R
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exchange.126  To be sure, many aggregate proceedings vindicate pub-
lic interests, such as ensuring compliance with the antitrust laws.127
The claiming approach, however, makes no effort “to disentangle the
private and public purposes of a citizen-initiated lawsuit,”128 and
instead treats all claims equally. Any agreement with too great an
effect on the incidence and availability of claiming is suspect.
III. THE CLAIMING APPROACH IN CONCEPCION
As the prior Part shows, there are problems with the claiming
approach.  The metric that approach tests for is not required by law.
The approach is over- and under-inclusive, with strong versions invali-
dating agreements that have no substantial effect on compliance and
weak versions enforcing agreements that permit widespread wrongdo-
ing.  And the approach fails to offer an account of the circumstances
in which private ordering should be respected.
These problems manifest themselves in doctrinal incoherence.
When the Supreme Court attempts to reconcile the claiming
approach with the preference for private ordering it has read into the
FAA, the Court perceives a binary choice between claiming and pri-
vate ordering.  The possibility that private ordering might give rise to
substantial harms is lost, as is the possibility that the law might
respond to such harms when they arise while generally respecting pri-
vate ordering.
There is no better example than Concepcion.  Confronted with the
district court’s findings that AT&T’s anti-aggregation agreement “suf-
ficiently incentivizes consumers in disputes involving small dollar
amounts to pursue [the] informal claims process,” and that individual
consumers were better off under the agreement than if class actions
126 See, e.g., Yu v. State St. Corp., 686 F. Supp. 2d 369, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  On
parties’ authority to limit contractual remedies, see, for example, Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Int’l Telecomms. Satellite Org., 991 F.2d 94, 98 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Equally sophisti-
cated parties who have the opportunity to allocate risks to third party insurance or
among one another should be held to only those duties specified by the agreed upon
contractual terms and not to general tort duties imposed by state law.” (quoting Mar-
tin Marietta Corp. v. Int’l Telecomms. Satellite Org., 763 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (D. Md.
1991))); Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 244 N.E.2d 685, 687 (N.Y. 1968)
(“Parties to a contract are given broad latitude within which to fashion their own
remedies for breach of contract.”).
127 See, e.g., In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 264 F.R.D. 100, 114
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
128 Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21,
22 (1996).
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were available,129 the Ninth Circuit offered only the assertion that the
policy of California law is to encourage claiming to justify invalidating
the agreement.130  Moreover, the Concepcion plaintiffs provided little
evidence to show that the AT&T agreement had problematic effects.
In the Supreme Court, they pointed to only four publicly available
sources to show the agreement allowed unchecked wrongdoing:
(1) AT&T’s inability to show that “ ‘claims . . . for deceptive advertis-
ing’ or ‘other alleged wrongdoing’” had been resolved through arbi-
tration (plaintiffs did not explain why AT&T would have arbitrated
such claims while Discover Bank was on the books);131 (2) a decision by
a Washington district court finding that “AT&T was involved in fewer
than 200 consumer arbitrations—representing, at that time, roughly
0.0029 percent of AT&T’s customers—over a five-year period from
2003 to 2007” (again, plaintiffs did not explain why AT&T should be
expected to have participated in more arbitrations at a time when
aggregate proceedings were permitted by Discover Bank);132 (3)
reports by two government agencies concluding that many consumers
are unhappy with their cellphone service;133 and (4) a statement by
the Better Business Bureau to the effect that “the wireless industry
generates more consumer complaints than any other industry.”134
Beyond this, plaintiffs proffered no evidence regarding the extent to
which the AT&T agreement allowed unchecked wrongdoing.  The dis-
trict court made no findings to this effect.135
129 Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2008 WL 5216255, at *11 & n.10 (S.D. Cal. Aug.
11, 2008) (No. 05CV1167 DMS (AJB)).
130 See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 856 n.9 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The
provision does essentially guarantee that the company will make any aggrieved cus-
tomer whole who files a claim.  Although this is, in and of itself, a good thing, the
problem with it under California law—as we read that law—is that not every aggrieved
customer will file a claim.”).
131 Brief for Respondents at 4, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2010) (citation omitted).
132 Id. at 4 (citing Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1257 (D. Wash.
2009)).
133 Id. at 5 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-34, FCC NEEDS TO
IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF WIRELESS PHONE SERVICE (2009), available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d1034.pdf; FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC SURVEY CONFIRMS CONSUM-
ERS EXPERIENCE MOBILE BILL SHOCK AND CONFUSION ABOUT EARLY TERMINATION FEES
(2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-29841
5A1.pdf).
134 Id. at 6 (citing Mary Pilon, Cellphone Industry Sparks the Most Complaints, WALL
ST. J. DIGITS BLOG, (Mar. 8, 2010, 1:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/03/
08/cellphone-industry-sparks-the-most-complaints/).
135 See Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2008 WL 5216255, at *2–5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11,
2008) (No. 05CV1167 DMS (AJB)).
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For the block of the Supreme Court open to private ordering and
hostile to aggregation to begin with, this was too much to take.  Speak-
ing through Justice Scalia, the Court bemoaned that the Discover Bank
rule “allows any party to a consumer contract to demand [aggrega-
tion],” notwithstanding the FAA’s requirement that agreements to
arbitrate be enforced “according to their terms.”136  This put Discover
Bank squarely at odds with the FAA, which ostensibly embodied Con-
gress’s commitment to “streamlined proceedings and expeditious
results.”137
The Court, however, seemed almost oblivious to the possibility
that enforcement of an anti-aggregation agreement could turn courts
into accessories to wrongdoing.  The only section of its opinion that
acknowledged the possibility responded to the dissent’s argument that
a state could mandate class-wide arbitration to ensure that “small-dol-
lar claims” do not “slip through the legal system.”138  “States,” the
Court retorted, “cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with
the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”139  The Court
immediately made clear, however, that no such wrongdoing was at
issue in Concepcion, because “the claim here was most unlikely to go
unresolved.”140
Accordingly, as a matter of reading precedent, Concepcion does
not preclude all judicial scrutiny of anti-aggregation agreements.141
136 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.at 1748, 1750.
137 Id. at 1749 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court elided the fact that
the Congress which enacted the FAA in 1925 could not possibly have had a view on
the transformation in class action practice that followed the 1966 amendments to the
federal rules.
138 Id. at 1753.
139 Id.
140 Id. (citations omitted) (“[T]he arbitration agreement provides that AT&T will
pay claimants a minimum of $7,500 and twice their attorney’s fees if they obtain an
arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last settlement offer.  The District Court found
this scheme sufficient to provide incentive for the individual prosecution of meritori-
ous claims that are not immediately settled, and the Ninth Circuit admitted that
aggrieved customers who filed claims would be ‘essentially guarantee[d]’ to be made
whole . . . .”).
141 Accord In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204, 216–17 (2d
Cir. 2012) (concluding that Concepcion did not overrule an earlier doctrine holding
that an anti-aggregation agreement must permit the effective vindication of statutory
rights, and that an arbitration agreement containing an anti-aggregation provision
may be challenged on the ground that it makes claiming cost-prohibitive); Myriam
Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 639–40 (2012) (noting that there are many clas-
ses of cases that class action waivers simply cannot reach). But see Litman v. Cellco
P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he holding of Concepcion [is] broad and
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But the unthinking way in which the majority dispatched Discover Bank
suggests the claiming approach’s problems of doctrinal design are
enduring.  In Concepcion, there was no credible suggestion that
AT&T’s agreement permitted extensive wrongdoing.  But when that
case inevitably occurs, the response will be the same.  The validity of
the agreement will turn on a fact of questionable relevance—the
agreement’s effect on claiming—setting up another round of
Supreme Court kabuki.
IV. THE OUTCOMES APPROACH
The claiming approach responds to the risks created by anti-
aggregation agreements by focusing on an agreement’s effect on
claiming.  Although some versions of the approach survive Concepcion,
this fact does not mitigate the analysis’s deeper problems or ensure
that it will withstand further scrutiny in the Supreme Court.  Thus,
regardless of Concepcion’s precedential effect, there is an urgent need
to revisit the law governing anti-aggregation agreements.
Fortunately, the very deficiencies of the claiming approach sug-
gest a way forward.  This new approach modifies the claiming
approach by shifting its focus to regulatory outcomes.  If an anti-aggre-
gation agreement permits the company it protects to engage in exten-
sive, unremedied wrongdoing, the agreement is not enforced.
This Part begins the project of explaining the outcomes-based
approach to anti-aggregation agreements.  I first describe the out-
comes approach and set forth its costs and benefits.  I then outline
strategies litigants might follow in proving that an anti-aggregation
agreement permits extensive, unchecked wrongdoing.  Finally, I con-
clude by revisiting Concepcion and considering whether, on the record
developed there, claimants challenging AT&T’s anti-aggregation
agreement could make the showing the outcomes approach demands.
A. Defining the Approach
The outcomes approach examines the ex post effect of an anti-
aggregation agreement on the protected company’s primary behavior.
If enforcing an agreement permits extensive, unremedied wrongdo-
ing, the agreement is not enforced because of its tendency to promote
violation of the law.142
clear: a state law that seeks to impose class arbitration despite a contractual agreement
for individualized arbitration is inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, the
FAA, irrespective of whether class arbitration ‘is desirable for unrelated reasons.’”).
142 See 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19:11 (Rich-
ard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2010).
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This approach modifies the claiming approach in two ways.
Functionally, it shifts the frame of analysis from ex ante to ex post.
Where the claiming approach assumes that an anti-aggregation agree-
ment’s potential interference with private enforcement of the law will
result in unremedied wrongdoing, the outcomes approach is to wait
and see.  The outcomes approach thus allows for the possibility that
an anti-aggregation agreement is welfare-enhancing, while providing a
backend safety valve in cases where the agreement has harmful effects.
Normatively, the outcomes approach alters the considerations
invoked to deny enforcement of an anti-aggregation agreement.  Both
the claiming and outcomes approaches are ultimately concerned with
enforcement of the law, and can be distinguished from theories of
procedure that, for example, justify claiming as an expression of dem-
ocratic values.143  But they invoke wrongdoing in fundamentally dif-
ferent ways.  Where the claiming approach focuses on the relationship
between an anti-aggregation agreement and the legislative decision to
authorize private enforcement, the outcomes approach views anti-
aggregation agreements through the lens of contract theory, examin-
ing whether enforcement of an agreement results in harms to the
integrity of the market, third parties, or the public.144  It is premised
on the view that widespread wrongdoing necessarily affects third par-
ties, in a way that justifies refusing to enforce a private, contractual
undertaking.
In making this move, the outcomes approach strengthens the
legal basis for non-enforcement of anti-aggregation agreements.  The
principle that contractual ordering will be respected only so long as it
does not give rise to harms to the integrity of the market, third parties,
or the public is well established, and perhaps best known from cases
where the consideration or performance contemplated by a contract
143 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing
that courts sit “to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative
texts such as the Constitution and statutes:  to interpret those values and to bring
reality into accord with them”).
144 The principle that “private transactions presumptively are efficient only if
there are no negative externalities, that is to say, no adverse effects on third parties,” is
commonplace in the law-and-economics literature.  Kevin E. Davis & Helen
Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 513–14 (2011) (col-
lecting sources).  Indeed, even strong advocates of private ordering acknowledge
externalities as a limitation on private parties’ regulatory authority. See, e.g., Robert D.
Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating
the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1684 (1996) (arguing that while the
state should generally enforce norms that arise from private ordering, it “cannot jus-
tify enforcing a norm that harms one community on the grounds that it arose from a
consensual process in another community”).
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would violate the law.  As early as 1829, the Supreme Court concluded
that a contract which had the effect of circumventing the maximum
interest rate chargeable by the Bank of the United States could not be
enforced because it worked “a fraud upon a statute.”145  In an early
twentieth-century case, the Court refused to give effect to an attor-
ney’s claim for fees that arose out of a conflicted representation,
because enforcement of the contract would “produce the recognized
abuses which follow fraud and disloyalty by agents and trustees.”146
Half a century later, the Court would write that although “[t]here is
no statutory code of federal contract law, . . . our cases leave no doubt
that illegal promises will not be enforced in cases controlled by the
federal law.”147  Many state law decisions are to the same effect.148  As
one state supreme court summarized the doctrine, “An agreement
which ‘contemplates or necessarily involves the defrauding or victimiz-
ing of third persons as its ultimate result’ is void as against public
policy.”149
The difficult questions, then, involve the precise connection
between enforcement of an anti-aggregation agreement and
unremedied wrongdoing sufficient to deny an agreement enforce-
ment.  What counts as wrongdoing?  When may an anti-aggregation
agreement be denied enforcement, and what precisely must be
145 Bank of U.S. v. Owens, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 527, 536 (1829).
146 Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160, 173 (1929).
147 Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 77 (1982).
148 See, e.g., Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 852 (10th
Cir. 1972) (applying Oklahoma law)(“An agreement, the object of which is the com-
mission of a civil wrong against a third person, is also illegal and void although such
wrong may not be an indictable offense or crime.”); L’Orange v. Med. Protective Co.,
394 F.2d 57, 62 (6th Cir. 1968) (applying Ohio law) (“The general rule is that an
insurance contract is illegal and void when its purpose is to promote, encourage or
effect a violation of law.”); Flegenheimer v. Brogan, 30 N.E.2d 591, 593 (N.Y. 1940)
(“Whatever is injurious to the interests of the public is void, on the grounds of public
policy.”); Tator v. Valden, 198 A. 169, 171 (Conn. 1938) (“It is unquestionably the
general rule, upheld by the great weight of authority, that no court will lend its assis-
tance in any way toward carrying out the terms of a contract, the inherent purpose of
which is to violate the law.”).
149 Shea v. Grafe, 274 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Wis. 1979) (quoting Twentieth Century
Co. v. Quilling, 110 N.W. 174, 176 (Wis. 1907)).  The principle that an agreement
which encourages violation of the law may not be enforced is also well established
within the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence.  For example, the Court wrote
in Mitsubishi that it “would have little hesitation in condemning [an arbitration]
agreement as against public policy” if it served as “a prospective waiver of a party’s
right to pursue statutory remedies.”  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
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shown?  Here, it will be helpful to define several features of the out-
comes approach with precision.
First, by “wrongdoing,” the approach contemplates any violation
of a public regulatory statute but excludes violations of purely “pri-
vate” rights, such as simple breach of contract.  The line is drawn at
this point because violation of a regulatory statute supports an infer-
ence that the defendant’s conduct harms third parties or the integrity
of the market.  The legislative determination that conduct is illegal
supplies the basis for concluding that the defendant’s behavior has
effects beyond the parties, which by definition are not priced into the
terms of their commercial relationship.  The wrongdoing contem-
plated by the outcomes approach thus encompasses the substantive
violations of the law most familiar from the class action context,
including violation of consumer protection laws,150 violation of the
antitrust laws,151 and violation of the federal securities statutes.152
Second, by “extensive” wrongdoing, the outcomes approach con-
templates wrongdoing an order of magnitude greater than that
alleged in a typical one-on-one dispute.  A rough guide is provided by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), which permits certification of a
class action only if “the class is so numerous that joinder of all mem-
bers is impracticable.”153  Wrongdoing that satisfies Rule 23(a)’s
numerosity standard generally establishes the “extensive wrongdoing”
contemplated by the outcomes approach, because it suggests an
underlying course of conduct that injures victims on a mass basis.
Third, the causal relationship required by the outcomes
approach is between enforcement of an anti-aggregation agreement
on one hand and unremedied wrongdoing on the other.  This design
choice responds to the difficulty of generalizing about the circum-
stances in which eliminating aggregate claiming will lead to unremed-
ied wrongdoing.  As noted, some anti-aggregation agreements will
cause a substantial gap in deterrence, but others will not.154 Requiring
150 See, e.g., Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 445, 454–55 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
151 See, e.g., In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 264 F.R.D. 100, 114
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
152 See, e.g., Yu v. State St. Corp., 686 F. Supp. 2d 369, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
153 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1); see 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE &  HERBERT
B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:12 (5th ed. 2011) (collecting cases and
noting that although Rule 23(a) does not incorporate a numerical threshold, courts
consider “judicial economy arising from avoidance of a multiplicity of actions, geo-
graphic dispersion of class members, size of individual claims, financial resources of
class members, and the ability of claimants to institute individual suits” in determin-
ing whether the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable).
154 See supra Parts II.B–C.
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a showing of unremedied wrongdoing ensures that anti-aggregation
agreements are invalidated only when enforcing the agreement pro-
duces an impermissible gap in the framework for regulatory
enforcement.
Finally, the showing that the outcomes approach demands is pre-
liminary, analogous to other threshold procedural showings such as
the requirement that a plaintiff show a plausible entitlement to relief
to withstand a motion to dismiss,155 the requirement that a plaintiff
show the requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied to obtain certification
of a class action,156 and the requirement that a plaintiff show the
defendant committed an act directed at the forum to establish per-
sonal jurisdiction.157  Like these requirements, the outcomes
approach does not require proof of the plaintiffs’ claims on the mer-
its.158  Proceedings will be “less formal” and evidence “less complete”
than in a full trial on the merits.159  And the findings reached by the
court will go only to enforceability of the anti-aggregation provision,
not the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.160
For purposes of explaining the outcomes approach, it may be
helpful to consider an illustrative case in which a court applying it
would not enforce an anti-aggregation agreement.161  Suppose a cable
television company that holds a monopoly on a major urban market
has a long history of imposing improper charges on customers and
correspondingly is the subject of a long history of class action litiga-
tion.  Following Concepcion, the company imposes an anti-aggregation
agreement on customers that is identical in all material respects to
AT&T’s.  The rate of claiming against the company predictably
declines to near-zero.  Nevertheless, a few cranks pressing insubstan-
155 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
156 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011); In re Hydrogen
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2008).
157 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984).
158 See Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (discussing prelimi-
nary injunctions).
159 Id.
160 Courts and commentators generally view the enforceability of an anti-aggrega-
tion agreement as a question for the court rather than the arbitrator. See, e.g., Kris-
tian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 53 (1st Cir. 2006); George A. Bermann, The
“Gateway” Problem in International Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 46 n.199
(2012).  Nevertheless, at least some challenges to provisions restricting the availability
of aggregation have been directed to arbitration. E.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Baz-
zle, 539 U.S. 444, 454 (2003).  So long as an arbitrator can conduct a reasonable
investigation into whether an anti-aggregation agreement permits unchecked wrong-
doing, the analysis proposed here could be undertaken by either court or arbitrator.
161 The example is based loosely on Kristian, 446 F.3d at 25.
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tial claims take advantage of the “plaintiff friendly” arbitration process
to assert claims against the company.  A year passes, and a consumer
group makes a threshold showing that the company has continued to
impose illegal charges, say by assessing a “Federal Telecommunica-
tions Fee” that is neither required by law nor permitted by the com-
pany’s service agreement.  The group alleges based on a review of SEC
filings that the company has not been the subject of any enforcement
proceedings by state or federal agencies.
Under the facts given, the company’s billing practices have been
preliminarily shown to violate the law.  They are uniform as to its mil-
lions of its customers.  There is a clear relationship between the com-
pany’s adoption of the anti-aggregation agreement and extensive,
unremedied wrongdoing.  And the class, by hypothesis, has affirma-
tively demonstrated that enforcement of the aggregation ban would
allow the defendant to continue its unlawful conduct.  A court apply-
ing the outcomes approach accordingly would have a strong basis for
invaliding the agreement.  The agreement does not simply to elimi-
nate a procedural mechanism capable of remedying wrongdoing but is
known to immunize the corporation for wrongdoing not addressed
through other enforcement mechanisms.162
Note that this conclusion provides a substantially stronger basis
for invalidating an anti-aggregation agreement than a mere reduction
in the rate of claiming.  Although the claiming and outcomes
approaches make use of similar evidence, the outcomes approach ties
the enforceability of the agreement to a fact of legal significance: its
relationship to known violation of the law.
B. Costs and Benefits
With its features defined, the costs and benefits of the outcomes
approach are readily apparent.  As for costs, an ex post analysis focused
on primary compliance with the law imposes a greater burden on liti-
gants seeking to escape an anti-aggregation agreement than an analy-
sis focused on claiming alone.  The requirement of showing
unremedied wrongdoing further creates a lag between the point at
which an anti-aggregation provision is adopted and the point at which
it may be successfully challenged.  Because the outcomes approach
demands evidence of unremedied wrongdoing, there will be a period of
time in which the agreement is enforced.
These costs, however, are offset by two important benefits.  The
first is accuracy.  As Part II explains, it is questionable whether a focus
162 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. R
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on claiming accurately identifies anti-aggregation agreements that
allow extensive unremedied wrongdoing.  The outcomes approach, by
contrast, tests for that phenomenon directly.  To be sure, it is theoreti-
cally possible that although it tests directly for compliance with the
law, the outcomes approach will identify fewer problematic agree-
ments than the claiming approach.  For example, it might be that
making the showing required by the outcomes approach is so difficult
that no litigant would undertake to invalidate an anti-aggregation
agreement.  But for reasons developed immediately below, I believe
that the showing demanded by the outcomes approach is reasonably
feasible to make.
Second, the outcomes approach is less susceptible than the claim-
ing approach to claims of inconsistency with the FAA.  The argument
that scrutiny of an anti-aggregation agreement countervenes the FAA
rests on the federal policy in favor of streamlined proceedings the
Supreme Court has read into the Act.163  Because aggregate proceed-
ings are costly and time-consuming, they offend the FAA.
Unsubstantiated claims about the effects of an anti-aggregation
agreement do not persuasively rebut that agreement, but a concrete
showing of unremedied wrongdoing does.  Where an agreement is
rejected under the outcomes approach, it is because the agreement is
known to promote violation of the law.  The court holds that the poli-
cies embodied in substantive law trump the FAA’s policy favoring
streamlined proceedings.  Indeed, invalidation of an anti-aggregation
agreement upon a showing that the agreement permits unremedied
wrongdoing follows from the assumption underlying the Court’s mod-
ern FAA jurisprudence—that regulatory statutes will continue to serve
their “remedial and deterrent function[s]” when dispute resolution is
shifted to a private forum.164  Even if one accepts at face value Concep-
cion’s statement that the reference to “arbitration” in the FAA favors
certain “fundamental” procedural attributes such as bilateral proceed-
ings,165 that fact does not preclude invalidating an anti-aggregation
agreement based on its actual effects on regulatory compliance.
163 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (“The
overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate
streamlined proceedings.”). But see Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stan-
ford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (“There is no federal policy favoring arbi-
tration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure
the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.”).
164 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
(1985).
165 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
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C. Proving Unremedied Wrongdoing
The outcomes approach is more accurate and less likely to suc-
cumb to claims of conflict with the FAA.  The question remains, how-
ever, whether this is a workable way of assessing anti-aggregation
agreement.  Can it reasonably be demonstrated that a corporation
protected by an anti-aggregation agreement has engaged in extensive
wrongdoing that has gone unremedied by reason of the agreement,
or is that showing impossible to make?
In part, this concern is addressed by the outcomes approach’s
similarity to other threshold procedural showings, such as the showing
required to withstand a motion to dismiss or obtain a preliminary
injunction.  Though the underlying claims can be staggeringly com-
plex, preliminary injunctions “are broadly used.”166  In principle,
there is no reason why establishing that an anti-aggregation agree-
ment permits extensive, unremedied wrongdoing would be more diffi-
cult than establishing a likelihood of success on the merits in the
“patent, copyright, and trademark infringement, corporate mergers,
breaches of contract, nuisances, marriages, entertainment, and even
manner of dress” cases in which the preliminary injunction is regu-
larly used.167
Moreover, at the nuts-and-bolts level, a number of strategies are
available for showing that an anti-aggregation agreement permits
extensive, unremedied wrongdoing.  A review of these strategies sug-
gests that although the burden imposed by the outcomes approach is
real, it is not insurmountable.
(1) Demonstrated wrongdoing, cost-prohibitive claiming—One strategy
is suggested by cases such as American Express.168  Plaintiffs might offer
evidence that enforcement of an anti-aggregation agreement would
166 Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Effi-
ciency, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381, 382–83 (2006).
167 Id.  For an example of the issues litigated in preliminary injunction proceed-
ings, consider claims of trademark infringement.  In New York federal court, litigants
must proffer evidence required by Judge Friendly’s Polaroid test. See Polaroid Corp. v.
Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (“Courts should examine (1) the
strength of the mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the two marks; (3) the
proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will ‘bridge the
gap’ [i.e., that the trademark owner will enter the market in which the allegedly
infringing use occurs];  (5) actual confusion; (6) the defendant’s good faith in adopt-
ing its mark; (7) the quality of the defendant’s product; and (8) the sophistication of
the buyers.”); see also Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 391 (2d Cir.
1995) (citation omitted).  The use of expert opinion evidence is common. See, e.g.,
Real News Project, Inc. v. Indep. World Television, Inc., 2008 WL 2229830 (S.D.N.Y.
May 27, 2008) (No. 06 Civ. 4322(GEL)).
168 See supra text accompanying notes 56–66. R
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make it cost prohibitive to assert claims on an individual basis along
with a threshold showing of wrongdoing.  Provided that the defendant
is not subject to alternate enforcement mechanisms—an issue on
which it would logically bear the burden of proof—these showings
would support the conclusion that an anti-aggregation agreement per-
mits extensive, unremedied wrongdoing.  As already noted, that con-
clusion provides a substantially stronger basis for invalidating an anti-
aggregation agreement than a mere reduction in the rate of
claiming.169
(2) Same conduct, restricted remedies—The second strategy relies on
the stability of the protected corporation’s conduct during the period
in which an anti-aggregation agreement is imposed.  The idea here is
to prove unremedied wrongdoing through evidence that: (a) the pro-
tected corporation engaged in a pattern of wrongdoing prior to adop-
tion of an anti-aggregation agreement; (b) the wrongdoing was
previously addressed through aggregate claiming; and (c) the defen-
dant did nothing to modify its conduct following its adoption of an
anti-aggregation agreement.
The potential of this strategy is illustrated by a 2002 decision of
the district court for the Northern District of California, Ting v.
AT&T.170  In May and June 2001, AT&T required customers of its
long-distance telephone service to assent to a “Consumer Services
Agreement” (CSA) as part of the de-tariffing process mandated by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.171  Section 7 of the CSA contained a
standard, if particularly lopsided, second generation anti-aggregation
clause which prohibited customers from asserting claims on an aggre-
gate basis.172  A challenge to the class-action waiver was brought by a
class of California consumers.
In a remarkable decision, the district court made thorough find-
ings regarding the circumstances in which the class-action waiver was
adopted and its effect on the mechanisms available to police AT&T’s
compliance with the law.  The court found that prior to adopting the
anti-aggregation provision, the company settled significant class
169 See supra text accompanying note 162. R
170 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds,
319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
171 Prior to the enactment and implementation of the 1996 Act, a long-distance
telecommunications carrier was prohibited “from charging [its customer] rates for its
services other than those specified in its duly filed tariff.” Ting, 319 F.3d at 1131.  The
1996 Act replaced the tariff system with one in which rates were subject to contract.
Id. at 1132.
172 Ting, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 910.
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actions alleging fraudulent and improper billing practices173 and that
enforcement of the class-action waiver would preclude similar actions
in the future.174  Discrediting an AT&T executive’s testimony that the
company “‘wanted to give the consumers a broad range of options’ to
resolve disputes,” the court determined “that AT&T’s principal pur-
pose” in imposing the agreement “was to put sufficient obstacles in
the path of litigants to effectively deter many claims from being pur-
sued.”175  The court further found that AT&T made numerous mis-
representations to secure consumers’ assent to the agreement;176 that
the Federal Communications Commission did not timely respond to
consumer complaints of improper or fraudulent billing and advertis-
ing practices by long-distance carriers (and in fact chose not to
address consumers’ claims as a matter of policy);177 and that enforce-
ment of the anti-aggregation provision “ultimately, would serve to
shield AT&T from liability even in cases where it has violated the
law.”178
Ting made these findings in the context of a state-law unconscio-
nability challenge; however, there is no reason they would not support
the conclusion that an anti-aggregation agreement allowed
unchecked wrongdoing.  Although the court did not expressly find
that AT&T’s anti-aggregation agreement permitted unremedied
wrongdoing, it found that enforcement of the agreement would
remove the only mechanism capable of remedying small-scale viola-
tions of the law.  Such a finding, combined with a threshold showing
173 Id. at 917–18.
174 Id. at 918 (“If the Legal Remedies Provisions contained in AT&T’s new CSA
had governed customers’ rights in these situations, it is highly unlikely [that] any of
the [class action] claims would have been prosecuted.”).
175 Id. at 920–21.
176 For example, the mailing announcing the imposition of the Customer Services
Agreement misleadingly advised customers “that your AT&T service or billing will not
change under the AT&T Consumer Services Agreement; there’s nothing you need to
do.” Id. at 911.  (In fact, if customers wished to avoid Section 7’s limitations on reme-
dies, they were required to cancel AT&T service.) See id. at 929.  Customers that
noticed Section 7’s arbitration provision and complained to AT&T were falsely
advised, “All of the other major long distance carriers have also included an arbitra-
tion provision in their service agreements.” Id. at  914.  (In fact, Verizon California,
which controlled 8.8% of the market at the time of suit, did not impose arbitration on
customers.) Id. at 929 n.15.
177 The court found that the FCC required seventeen years to respond effectively
to consumer complaints of ‘“slamming,’ the unauthorized substitution of a con-
sumer’s preferred long distance carrier for another without proper consent.” Id. at
919.
178 Id. at 918.
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that the company engaged in wrongdoing, would permit a court fol-
lowing the outcomes approach to refuse to enforce the agreement.
(3) Generalizing from individual adjudications—A final strategy for
proving extensive, unremedied wrongdoing relies on insights from
the class certification context.  The intuition here is that if a defen-
dant is consistently losing adjudications or arbitrations (“adjudica-
tions,” for short) and would face class-wide liability but for a
restriction on aggregation, a court may conclude that the agreement
permits extensive, unremedied wrongdoing.
As a formal matter, two showings are necessary to establish the
invalidity of an anti-aggregation agreement this way.  First, the plain-
tiff must present a statistically valid sample of adjudications that
resolved claims representative of those held by a broader class of simi-
larly situated persons.179  And second, the adjudications must have
been overwhelmingly resolved in favor of the claimant.  Where a
plaintiff makes these showings, a court will again have a strong basis
for invalidating an anti-aggregation agreement.  Through evidence of
wrongdoing at the micro level, the litigant establishes that the defen-
dant has engaged in macro-level wrongdoing that has not been
addressed by reason of a contractual limitation on aggregation.
Is this workable?  Several issues must be addressed.  The first set
involves the costs of bringing individual adjudications that are
presented as evidence of unremedied wrongdoing.  If the amount at
stake in an individual arbitration or litigation is paltry, will the claim-
ant find it worthwhile to assert a claim?
Although this concern is important, the economic incentives for
plaintiff-side firms to attack anti-aggregation provisions suggest it can
be overcome.  As an extensive literature describes, aggregate litigation
in the United States is largely underwritten by well-capitalized and
diversified plaintiff-side firms that stand to earn a percentage of the
recovery in cases they litigate.180  Such financing has traditionally
179 The requirement of statistical validity imposes a number of constraints on
plaintiffs’ selection of individual test cases.  For example, the universe of claims must
be defined appropriately, sample cases must be selected at random, and a sufficiently
large sample must be adjudicated. Cf. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by
Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 629–33 (2012) (describing sampling requirements for
trial of aggregate claims).
180 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 670 n.1 (1986) (“[A] key characteristic [of plaintiff’s attorneys
litigating complex products-liability actions is] their ability to make substantial cash
investments in an action.”); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class
Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
103, 163 (2007) (“[P]laintiffs’ class action lawyers . . . not only comprise the most
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occurred through contingency-fee agreements,181 but there is no
apparent reason why plaintiff-side firms could not undertake to
represent individual claims to lay a groundwork for a challenge to an
anti-aggregation agreement.182  Indeed, because anti-aggregation pro-
visions threaten a substantial revenue stream for such firms, it will be
in their economic self-interest to do so.183
Another set of concerns, familiar from the mass tort context,
involves the possibility that a corporate defendant will settle meritori-
ous cases to prevent plaintiffs from amassing enough evidence of
wrongdoing to mount a challenge to an anti-aggregation agreement.
In the mass tort context, it is common for corporate defendants to
settle strong claims rather than risk the large verdicts, collateral estop-
pel, and development of adverse precedent that litigation and trial
invites.184  In the anti-aggregation context, one might similarly worry
effective lobbying counterweight to corporate interests in contemporary politics, but
. . . use their wealth to finance further class action litigation against U.S.
companies.”).
181 Molot, supra note 103, at 90.
182 A plaintiff-side firm’s representation of individual claimants could almost cer-
tainly be structured to observe the common law prohibitions of Champetry (trading
an interest in the proceeds of litigation for money) and maintenance (financing of
litigation by an “intermeddler” with no interest in the suit). See 14 C.J.S. Champerty
and Maintenance §§ 1–2 (2011).  This is because the common law does not consider an
agreement “to render the ordinary services of an attorney, in consideration of receiv-
ing a percentage of the money or a part of the thing recovered,” unlawful. Id. § 13
(citing Marshall v. Bickel, 445 A.2d 606 (D.C. 1982); Genins v. Geiger, 240 S.E.2d 745
(Ga. 1977)).
183 The suggestion that litigation of individual claims will be underwritten by
plaintiff-side firms raises the possibility of free-riding.  If firms A, B, and C undertake
a campaign of individual litigation to establish the invalidity of anti-aggregation agree-
ment, what is to be done if firms X, Y, and Z subsequently commence proceedings
that exploit the value of the earlier work?  In the related situation presented by non-
class aggregate proceedings, the law responds by requiring X, Y, and Z to compensate
A, B, and C for the value of the “common benefit” created by A, B, and C’s work. See,
e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 594 F.3d 113, 130 (2d Cir. 2010) (Kaplan, J.,
concurring) (“The desirability—indeed, the compelling need—to have pretrial pro-
ceedings managed or at least coordinated by lead counsel or a steering or executive
committee demands the existence of a source of compensation for their efforts on
behalf of all.”).  This suggests that existing law provides workable mechanisms for
controlling freeriding.
184 The best known example of this phenomenon involves the 1990s blood prod-
ucts litigation that led to the Seventh Circuit’s controversial decision in In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc., 138 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 1998).  Although plaintiffs prevailed
in eighty-nine to ninety-two percent of cases when settlements were taken into
account, the win rate dropped to approximately eight percent when settlements were
excluded. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 45
(2007).
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that defendant corporations will settle individual proceedings rather
than allow plaintiff-side firms to develop a portfolio of cases that can
be used to attack an anti-aggregation agreement.
But again, the economic incentives facing plaintiff-side firms sug-
gest these concerns are manageable.  A corporate defendant’s ability
to pick off unfavorable cases reflects its ability to offer an attractive
financial package to both the plaintiff (whose financial interest is in
securing the maximum damage award possible) and her attorney
(whose interest is in securing the largest fee possible).185  For obvious
reasons, this complicates defense-side efforts to pick off individual
claims brought to establish the invalidity of an anti-aggregation agree-
ment.186  Furthermore, even if defendants succeed in settling individ-
ual claims, the fact of repeated settlements may serve as evidence of
wider unremedied wrongdoing.187
Lastly, it might be objected that accepting settlements of prior
claims is in tension with the “‘the presumption of privacy and confi-
185 Indeed, the standard theoretical account of the client-lawyer relationship
predicts that settlement will occur when a defendant’s payment to the attorney, not
client, is maximized.  See Coffee, supra note 180, at 686 (concluding that once the
agency costs that inhere in the attorney-client relationship between class action lawyer
and client are accounted for, “it is not the plaintiffs’ damages but the attorney’s recov-
ery that establishes the equilibrium level” at which settlement occurs).
186 As the Supreme Court’s decision in Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), illus-
trates, an attorney sometimes has an ethical obligation to advise her client to settle
litigation when what is offered by the defendant is all the client seeks. See id. at 722
(explaining attorney’s belief that he was ethically required to accept settlement that
“offered virtually all of the injunctive relief [plaintiffs] had sought in their com-
plaint”).  In the anti-aggregation context, claimants can avoid this dilemma by
demanding an injunction or declaration that the anti-aggregation provision is invalid
in their statement of claim.
187 The use of settlements to establish the invalidity of an anti-aggregation agree-
ment is not prohibited by the law of evidence.  Although Federal Rule of Evidence
408 “prohibits the admission of a settlement . . . when offered to prove a defendant’s
liability[, the Rule] does not prohibit evidence of settlements when offered for pur-
poses not otherwise prohibited . . . .”  AIG Global Sec. Lending Corp. v. Banc of Am.
Sec. LLC, 646 F. Supp. 2d 385, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  A court following the outcomes
approach does not examine whether the defendant is liable for wrongdoing but the
enforceability of a contractual restriction on aggregation.  As a result, the introduc-
tion of settlements into evidence is not barred by Rule 408. Cf. Brady v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding admission of prior consent
decree offered to prove that “defendant was aware of its legal obligations”); Catullo v.
Metzner, 834 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st Cir. 1987) (reversing trial court’s refusal to admit
prior settlement offered to establish corporate mismanagement).
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dentiality’ that applies in many bilateral arbitrations.”188  That pre-
sumption, however, is created by the rules of arbitral fora.189  It is not
a limit on the admissibility of evidence in court, which in any event
may be done in camera to preserve confidentiality.
D. Concepcion Revisited
The showing that an anti-aggregation agreement allows extensive,
unremedied wrongdoing can thus be made in a number of ways.  To
illustrate, I conclude this Part by briefly revisiting Concepcion and con-
sidering whether plaintiffs challenging AT&T’s anti-aggregation
agreement could show the requisite wrongdoing.
As described above, the factual record in Concepcion was sparse.
By the time the Supreme Court considered the case, the most damn-
ing evidence of wrongdoing plaintiffs could adduce was a finding by a
district court in an unrelated case that AT&T was involved in fewer
than 200 consumer arbitrations between 2003 and 2007 (during
which time courts allowed class-action claiming against AT&T), and
reports by two government agencies stating that consumers were gen-
erally unhappy with their cell phone service.190  Plaintiffs did not oth-
erwise demonstrate that the AT&T agreement had concrete negative
effects.
This failure proved fatal to the California courts’ efforts to invali-
date the agreement using the Discover Bank rule, and it would likewise
prove fatal to a court following the outcomes approach.  A showing
that a company’s customers are unhappy and assert relatively few
claims justifies viewing an anti-aggregation agreement with skepticism,
but it does not prove that the agreement allowed the company to
engage in substantial, unremedied wrongdoing.
From the perspective of the outcomes approach, however, this
does not end the analysis.  Because that approach considers an anti-
aggregation agreement’s broader effects, Concepcion’s rejection of the
Discover Bank standard would not preclude a later challenge on the
ground that AT&T’s agreement permits substantial, unremedied
wrongdoing.  Challengers could attempt to make this showing by gen-
188 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010)
(quoting AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS
(2003) [hereinafter “Supplemental Class Rules”]).
189 See, e.g., Supplemental Class Rule 1(a) (“These Supplementary Rules . . . shall
apply to any dispute rising out of an agreement that provides for arbitration pursuant
to any of the rules of the American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’) where a party
submits a dispute to arbitration on behalf of or against a class or purported class
. . . .”).
190 See supra text accompanying note 133. R
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eralizing from individual adjudications; if the undisclosed imposition
of a charge to compensate AT&T for sales tax was shown to violate
California consumer protection law and a substantial number of cus-
tomers prevailed on a claim to this effect in arbitration, that would
support a claim that the AT&T’s aggregation ban allowed extensive
unremedied wrongdoing.  The same showing, however, could also be
made through the kind of evidence developed in Ting.191  In this
respect, it is interesting to note that in the years immediately prior to
Concepcion, AT&T settled class actions alleging numerous improper
practices, involving data service, “out-of-cycle” billing, the Universal
Connectivity Charge, and “mysterious charges for ringtones and other
content.”192
CONCLUSION
Procedural doctrines are unavoidably informed by “value-loaded
judgments about how the world operates” that “inhabit a grey area
between the substantive law and propositions so obvious or widely
accepted they may be judicially noticed.”193  Though these “judgmen-
tal facts” appear to describe how the world operates, they are “mixed
with judgment, policy ideas, opinion, discretion or philosophical
preference.”194
Defenders of aggregate litigation have long maintained that it is
necessary to effective enforcement of the law; and their arguments
have been accepted by courts following the claiming approach.  The
approach assumes a regulatory environment wherein enforcement is
largely delegated to private attorneys general, such that restrictions on
private regulatory enforcement inevitably lead to unremedied wrong-
doing.  The Supreme Court’s skepticism in Concepcion is a useful
reminder, however, that the world is not necessarily so simple.  Some-
times eliminating aggregation will have a substantial effect on compli-
ance, sometimes it won’t.
Where the claiming approach assumes a connection between
restrictions on aggregation and the existence of unremedied wrong-
191 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds,
319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
192 See, e.g., AT&T Announces the Proposed Settlement of Class Action Lawsuits Relating
to AT&T Wireless, PR NEWSWIRE July 2, 2010, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/att-announces-the-proposed-settlement-of-class-action-lawsuits-relating-
to-att-wireless-97660444.html; Peter Svensson, AT&T Settles Suit Over 3rd-Party Cell
Phones Fees, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June, 2, 2008.
193 David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 139 (2011) (citing
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.10, at 178 (2d ed. 1980)).
194 Id. (quoting DAVIS, supra note 193, § 15.10, at 178).
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doing, the outcomes approach insists that it be shown.  If that showing
is made, it will do much to ensure the availability of aggregate litiga-
tion in a system increasingly open to private control of dispute resolu-
tion procedure.  Unlike the Concepcion dissent’s claim “that class
proceedings are necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might
otherwise slip through the legal system[,]”195 demonstrated wrongdo-
ing is the kind of fact that sticks in the throat.  Where established, it
will prove fatal to the anti-aggregation agreement.
195 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (characteriz-
ing the dissent).
